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Abstract
Income segregation produces unequal social outcomes and has steadily increased
since the 1970s. High-poverty neighborhoods suffer from low performing schools, fewer
jobs, an evaporation of local role models (Wilson 1987; Reardon and Bischoff 2011a).
Recent evidence suggests growing income inequality influences the segregation of
affluence more than the segregation of poverty (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b).
Metropolitan areas that display strong population and economic growth are susceptible to
higher levels of income inequality. I use three unique quantitative approaches to measure
the segregation of affluence and poverty in a comparison of four metropolitan areas
exhibiting strong growth to four metros with weaker growth. I find the increase in income
segregation between 1990 and 2010 is attributable to the increase in the segregation of
affluence. Weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher levels of income segregation than
strong metros due to their significantly higher levels of segregation of poverty; however,
strong metros exhibit higher levels of segregation of affluence.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Income inequality is rapidly growing in the United States and recently reached its
highest level since the Great Depression. Between 1980 and 2011, the Gini coefficient for
household income increased 16%, from .404 to .469 (Fry and Taylor 2012). The growth
of income inequality shifted segregation research towards income segregation,
specifically the segregation of poverty (Wilson 1987; Massey et al. 2009). Income
segregation produces unequal social outcomes; and high-poverty neighborhoods suffer
from low performing schools, fewer job opportunities, higher crime rates and an
evaporation of local role models (Wilson 1987; Reardon and Bischoff 2011a). Although
most research focuses only on the segregation of poverty, recent evidence suggests
growing income inequality influences the segregation of affluence more than the
segregation  of  poverty,  “During  the  last  four  decades,  the  isolation  of  the  rich  has been
consistently  greater  than  the  isolation  of  the  poor”  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b, 22).
This thesis focuses on the segregation of poverty and affluence in eight metropolitan
areas over the past twenty years.
Income inequality is higher in metropolitan areas than other geographic places in
the United States (Berube 2014). Furthermore, successful metropolitan areas, those with
above average economic and population growth suffer from greater income inequality
(Florida 2003, Brookings 2010). Metropolitan areas with below average growth are likely
to have more equal distribution of income (Brookings 2010). The largest metropolitan
1

areas are growing faster than other size metropolitan areas and the annual gross product
of the top ten US metros exceeds that of the bottom 36 states (IHS Global Insight 2013).
As metropolitan areas capture larger shares of the national population and economic
output, it is important to investigate how income inequality manifests spatially.
After a nationwide decline in poverty during the 1990s, a striking development
occurred in the 2000s: as poverty rates increased, the majority of growth occurred in
suburban areas, not the urban core. This new geography of poverty in metropolitan areas
requires more research into the location and patterns of income groups in the United
States because many of the current place-based policies are not designed to fight poverty
in this new location. The suburbanization of poverty has broad policy implications that
affect revenue sharing between levels of government, transportation planning and the
implementation of social services (Kneebone and Berube 2013).
To study the relationship between metropolitan growth and income segregation,
this thesis focuses on four metropolitan areas (Austin, Denver, Seattle, and Washington,
DC) considered to be economically successful and four metropolitan areas (Buffalo,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Memphis) with weaker growth in effort to answer: Do cities with
strong economic and population growth exhibit different patterns of income
segregation than cities with weak economic and population growth?
I incorporate two classic approaches, segregation indices and concentrated income
neighborhoods, to analyze income segregation in the past two decades. In addition, I
incorporate two local spatial statistics to explore the spatial patterns of poverty and
affluence within each city. This research uses this multi-method approach to analyze the
2

segregation of fragmented income groups in an attempt to answer: What are the trends
of residential segregation by income between 1990 and 2010, and how have spatial
patterns changed during that time?
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of economic and population growth
on the segregation of low-income and high-income populations in the past 20 years while
incorporating classic segregation measures and a new statistical approach to gauge those
impacts. Harvey (1973) calls for a greater emphasis on the relationship between social
processes and space,  and  argues  cities  “are  founded  upon  the  exploitation of the many by
the few” (314). Income segregation is the social process of income inequality taking
spatial form. This research examines whether successful cities dampen or amplify that
exploitation.
This thesis has five chapters: literature review, methods, results, discussion, and
conclusion. The literature review includes the academic literature that informed the
project and guided my project design; and a section focused on the history, strengths, and
shortcomings of residential segregation approaches. The methods section contains an
explanation of how metropolitan areas were selected, data sources, and how each
statistical test was performed. The results section outlines the findings from each
segregation measure. In the discussion, I relate the findings to existing literature and
finally, in the conclusion, a summary of the findings and suggested avenues of potential
future research.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
The first part of the literature review focuses on the growth of income inequality
in the United States, its link to income segregation, and the consequences of segregation
and concentrated poverty. Subsequently, I examine the prevalence of income inequality
in metropolitan areas and provide two housing policy examples that illustrate how
governance contributes to the rise of segregation in United States. Finally, I highlight
recent research revealing the suburbanization of poverty and the policy implications of
the changing geography of low-income populations.
Income Inequality, Segregation and the Underclass
Income segregation was not a great concern in the United States until inequality
exploded in the 1970s. The post-World War II economic boom was distributed relatively
evenly among Americans (Massey et al. 2009; Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). Yet,
following this period of egalitarian growth, the Gini coefficient1 for household income in
the United States grew from .395 to .464 between 1973 and 2003 (Massey 2007). By
2006, inequality was higher than any point since the Great Depression. In the late 1920s,
the top 10% earned 46% of income and in 2006 the same group earned 45%. These ratios
amplified even within that small group – the top 1% received 20% in the 1920s and 18%
of  all  income  in  the  mid  2000’s  (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). The gap between rich and
1

  A  measure  of  income  inequality,  zero  expresses  perfect  equality  while  one  
expresses  maximum  inequality
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poor exploded and the spatial separation of two income classes manifested spatially –
affluent households on the periphery and poverty in the center.
Heightened  levels  of  income  inequality  since  1970  contributed  to  the  rapid  
increase  of  income  segregation  (Massey  and  Denton  1993;;  Jargowsky  1996;;  Massey  et  
al.  2009;;  Watson  2009;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b;;  Fry  and  Taylor  2012).  Between  
1970  and  2000,  more  than  60%  of  metropolitan  areas  experienced  an  increase  in  
segregation  of  the  rich  from  the  poor  (Watson  2009).  As  inequality  grew,  the  rich  and  
poor  each  grew  increasingly  isolated.  The  percentage  of  families  living  in  poor  or  affluent  
neighborhoods  doubled  from  15%  in  1970  to  31%  in  2010  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a).  
Metropolitan  inequality  is  not  created  equally  and  can  be  measured  in  many  ways  
(Berube  2014)  Criteria  of  income  groups  and  distributions  of  income  are  two  factors  that  
influence  an  inequality  index.  Two  widely  different  income  distributions  may  ultimately  
yield  the  same  inequality  value  because  inequality  can  be  high  when  the  rich  are  
incredibly  rich  or  when  the  poor  are  incredibly  poor  (Berube  2014).
Income  inequality  does  not  equally  affect  the  segregation  of  poverty  and  the  
segregation  of  affluence.  High  levels  of  inequality  due  to  the  growth  of  a  small  
percentage  of  high-income  earners  can  minimize  the  difference  between  low-income  
households  and  actually  decrease  the  segregation  of  poverty  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  
2011b).  Theoretically,  income  inequality  alone  does  not  result  in  income  segregation,  yet  
a  widening  division  of  income  suggests  a  greater  discrepancy  in  housing  prices  and  
greater  residential  sorting  (Bischoff  and  Reardon  2011a).  In  effect,  affluent  households  
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are  able  to  build  “citadels  of  power…through  the  use  of  social  and/or  physical  means  of  
fortification”  (Marcuse  1997,  315).
The  growth  of  income  segregation  is  largely  attributable  to  the  growth  of  affluent  
households  (Dwyer  2009;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a;;  Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011b,  Fry  
and  Taylor  2012).  Reardon  and  Bischoff  (2011b)  find  that  income  inequality  influences  
the  segregation  of  affluence  and  attribute  the  segregation  of  poverty  to  housing  policy  
more  than  income  inequality.  Segregation  of  poverty  may  also  be  attributable  to  the  
reduction  in  low-skilled  employment  opportunities  (Wilson  1987;;  Watson  2009).  Highincome  households  have  grown  faster  than  other  income  groups  in  recent  decades  and  
therefore  occupy  greater  shares  of  metropolitan  areas  (Fry  and  Taylor  2012).  The  
likelihood  of  a  high-income  household  living  in  a  tract  with  other  high-income  
households  increased  by  25%  between  1980  and  2010  (Fry  and  Taylor  2012).
The  isolation  of  affluent  populations  is  consequential  because  “a  significant  
proportion  of  society’s  resources  are  concentrated  in  smaller  and  smaller  proportion  of  
neighborhoods”  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a,  22).  The  best  schools,  parks,  green  spaces,  
and  other  public  goods  are  isolated  among  the  affluent  (Reardon  and  Bischoff  2011a).  
Arguably,  the  concentration  of  affluence  reduces  understanding  and  apathy  towards  the  
challenges  associated  with  poverty  (Brinegar  and  Leonard  2008).  Potentially  the  most  
drastic  side  effect  of  the  increasing  isolation  of  affluent  populations  is  the  lack  of  
exposure  low-  and  middle-income  households  have  to  affluent  populations.  Although  
income  inequality  is  less  likely  to  influence  segregation  of  poverty,  it  inherently  
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concentrates  poverty  due  to  the  evaporation  of  affluent  households  in  low-  and  moderateincome  neighborhoods.  
The spatial separation of rich and poor negatively affect low-income groups to a
greater extent due to the reduction of role models, good schools and work opportunities
(Wilson 1987; Dwyer 2009; Lichter et al. 2012). Concentrating poverty concentrates
single mothers, alcoholism and drug abuse (Massey and Denton 1993). The lack of strong
social capital diminishes the opportunities for young people born into these
neighborhoods because the networks within their communities are limited (Putnam
2000). The concentration of poverty received significant attention in the second half of
the 20th century as many Americans prospered in suburban areas, but many were left
behind, both economically and geographically.
Jobs left the urban core and few opportunities remained for citizens on the lowest
rung of the economic ladder. People with financial ability to flee central cities did so in
favor of better schools, lower taxes and the affordability of home ownership (Freeman
2010). This development reinforced racial segregation and promoted the concentration of
poverty in central cities. The growth of low-income families and evaporation of middleincome families increased demand for social services; local governments were forced to
cut services or raise taxes, either of which promoted additional inner city decay and
population loss (Massey and Denton 1993; Joassart-Marcelli et al. 2008). Between 1970
and 1990 high poverty neighborhoods2 increased from 4.1 to 8 million (Massey et al.
1994; Jargowsky 1996). Simply, there were more poor people occupying more poor
places. The group enveloped in this staggering concentration of poverty is the underclass.
2

  a  census  tract  with  a  poverty  rate  of  40  percent  or  higher
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The underclass is a group immersed in poverty struggling from the limitations
associated with their surroundings. Ricketts and Sawhill (1988) describe the underclass as
having four common characteristics: 1) high drop-out rates for high school students, 2)
high percentage of single-mother households, 3) high number of able bodied men not in
the work force, and 4) a high proportion of households relying on public assistance. The
underclass, and the tribulations of concentrated poverty were the bases to income
segregation research.
Two  seminal  works,  William  Julius  Wilson’s  The Truly Disadvantaged (1987),
and  Doug  Massey  and  Nancy  Denton’s  American Aparthied (1993), are the foundation
for much of today’s research focused on the underclass, segregation and economic
opportunity for disadvantaged populations in urban areas. Their work piqued the interest
of scholars and has fueled two decades of questions pertaining to the plight of
disadvantaged groups in urban areas.
Racial segregation dominates United States history. Any discussion of segregation
without racial segregation is inadequate. The injustice African-Americans faced for much
of the 20th century extended far beyond residential spaces into schools, buses, churches
and water fountains. Skin color greatly influenced where a person lived, among other
things, until the United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Massey and
Denton 1993). Prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, redlining – the practice of lending
institutions, public and private, limiting or refusing to provide loans in particular areas of
cities, particularly inner city minority areas – promoted racially segmented pockets in
American cities (Massey and Denton 1993; Massey et al. 1994). The history of injustice
8

towards African-Americans resulted in many arguing the underclass was confined to the
ghetto, yet Hispanics and whites each had low-income neighborhoods (Massey and
Denton 1993; Jargowsky 1996). Despite the injustices toward African-Americans,
Wilson (1987) contended race was not the driving factor of the underclass.
William Julius Wilson (1987) argued the underclass was the result of broad
economic restructuring and the concentration of poverty should be studied through the
lens of class, not race. A shift away from manufacturing, low-skilled jobs to service
industry positions on the periphery left unskilled laborers in the inner city with few
opportunities. Massey and Denton (1993) reintroduced segregation into the American
vocabulary  and  agreed  with  Wilson’s  assertion,  yet  argued  what  “made  it  a  
disproportionately black underclass  was  racial  segregation”  (137).
Wilson (1987) believed the outmigration of middle class black families from
previously economically heterogeneous black neighborhoods left behind poor black
families in the inner city. Wilson studied neighborhoods and families in Chicago and
noted middle class black families leaving deeply impoverished neighborhoods upon
securing the financial means to do so. As a result, the concentration of poor families, the
majority of which were black, remained in economically depressed neighborhoods.
Middle-income families chose to live in neighborhoods of similar economic class,
regardless of race, and the result was a socioeconomically depressed class confined to
inner cities.
Massey  and  Denton  (1993)  argued  racially  motivated  decisions,  such  as  redlining,  
excluded  African  Americans  from  neighborhoods  and  promoted  the  concentration  of  
9

poverty  in  the  inner  city  (Massey  et  al.  1994).  Massey  and  Denton  (1993)  acknowledge  
Wilson’s  idea,  yet  find  in  their  study,  “(t)he  residential  segregation  of  African  Americans  
cannot  be  attributed  in  any  meaningful  way  to  the  socioeconomic  disadvantages  they  
experience,  however  serious  these  may  be”  (1993,  88).  Blacks  are  more  segregated  than  
whites  of  similar  economic  status  because  black  families  do  not  have  equal  neighborhood  
purchasing  power  (Massey  and  Denton  1993).  Blacks  have  higher  poverty  rates  than  
whites,  and  as  a  result  “racial  segregation  concentrates  poverty,  and  it  does  so  without  
anyone  having  to  move  anywhere  else”  (Massey  and  Denton  1993,  125).  Income  
segregation  inherently  emerges  as  a  result  of  racial  segregation.
Racial  segregation  declined  in  the  last  third  of  the  twentieth  century,  but  given  the  
astonishingly  high  degree  of  segregation,  the  problem  remained  (Jargowsky  1996;;  
Massey  et  al.  2009).  Jargowsky  (1996)  examined  economic  segregation  within  racial  and  
ethnic  groups.  Income’s  underlying  relationship  between  race  and  ethnicity  affects  
economic  segregation  and  has  a  major  influence  on  the  metropolitan  landscape  (Massey  
and  Denton  1993;;  Jargowsky  1996;;  Watson  2009).  A  high  degree  of  economic  
segregation  within  one  racial  or  ethnic  group  alters  the  economic  segregation  of  the  total  
population.  Jargowsky  (1997)  noted  high  rates  of  poverty  are  common  for  all  racial  and  
ethnic  groups.  He  describes  ghettos,  barrios  and  slums  as  residential  enclaves  for  lowincome  blacks,  Hispanics  and  whites.  Between  1970  and  1990,  economic  segregation  
increased  for  all  three  of  these  racial  or  ethnic  groups,  however,  the  rate  was  not  equally  
distributed  between  racial  or  ethnic  groups.  Income  segregation  of  black  and  Hispanic  
populations  increased  at  a  faster  rate  than  whites  over  the  20-year  period  and  furthermore  
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blacks  and  Hispanics  segregation  levels  grew  faster  in  the  1980s  while  the  majority  of  
income  segregation  for  white  households  occurred  in  the  1970s  (Jargowsky  1996).
Racial segregation, the segregation of poverty and the segregation of affluence are
linked in a way that make it challenging to discuss independent of one another, yet
different processes are at play and the links are far more blurred than they inherently
appear. The minority populations segregate for vastly different reasons. Moreover,
despite the link between race and class, different processes influence racial segregation
and the segregation of poverty. The differences are most apparent when we consider the
integration processes of these three types of segregation, each would require their own
unique policy prescription.
In this thesis, my focus on income segregation is not to diminish the importance
of racial segregation or its consequences. Class segregation negatively effects the black
population more than whites (Massey and Denton 1993). Therefore, it is important to
understand what cities have the lowest levels of class segregation. Racial segregation is
the result of overt discrimination and personal biases, but socioeconomic status is the
market’s  influence  in  the  organization  of  urban  areas  (Fainstein  et  al.  1992;;  Jargowsky  
1997). A solution to the segregation of income groups nudges toward a reduction in racial
segregation. Spatial distance, and barriers to overcome it, inhibits the least advantaged
populations from opportunity and conflicts with the ideals of democracy and the
American Dream. I argue segregation by income concentrates the extremes of social
capital and public good. In a political system where money translates into political power,
attaining political influence becomes incredibly easy, or impossibly challenging,
11

depending on the neighborhood you live. At the very least, the growth of income
inequality in the past four decades illustrates the need to investigate income segregation
in metropolitan areas as the growing income disparity translates into a division of urban
space (Fainstein et al. 1992; Ades et al. 2012).
Low-income  neighborhoods  are  related  to  broader  economic  opportunities  
available  in  the  metropolitan  area  or  larger  region  (Jargowsky  1997,  Cooke  1999).  If  a  
region  is  struggling  from  a  lack  of  jobs  (ie.  manufacturing  in  the  Midwest),  more  lowincome  neighborhoods  are  likely  to  emerge,  “While  the  labor  market  generates  income  
inequality,  the  housing  market  is  the  arena  in  which  the  spatial  distribution  of  that  
inequality  is  determined”  (Jargowsky  1996,  991).  Income  segregation  is  the  result  of  
economic  disparities  within  metropolitan  regions  playing  out  in  the  private  market.
The growth of income inequality on a national level illustrates the need to
understand its influence in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas with above average
economic and population growth are susceptible to higher levels of income inequality
(Florida 2003; Brookings 2010).
Metropolitan Area Success and Inequality
Economic value is the most widely accepted barometer for success in the United
States. Urban policies are continually evaluated in terms of economic value rather than
social costs (Fainstein 2010). Urban leaders focus on economic growth as their primary
responsibility, with the belief that growth is the most efficient way to ensure good for all
members of the community (Fainstein 2010). Any social costs will be corrected when the
economic ripples of a successful policy broaden the opportunity for all members of the
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community, or so the thinking goes.  The  measures  of  a  policy’s  ‘success’  rarely  stray  
from economic assessment. Evaluation centers on jobs created, effect on housing prices,
or  another  measure  of  economic  value,  “the  desirability  of  growth  is  usually  assumed,  
while  the  consequences  for  social  equity  are  rarely  mentioned”  (Fainstein  2010,  2).  The  
idea of economic growth providing the greatest amount of good requires constant
evaluation. Do cities with strong economies that attract educated workers offer the most
access to opportunity to all?
The Brookings Institution (2010) highlights successful metropolitan areas as those
that exceed the national average in educational attainment, population growth and
diversity. In the State of Metropolitan American in 2010, Brookings classified nine
metropolitan  areas  as  the  “Next  Frontier.”  These metropolitan areas attract immigrants,
families and young workers because of strong, diversified economies and attractive
climates. The authors note one drawback of these cities’  growth is the widening gap in
education and income.
Another popular measure of success in urban literature is creative cities. Creative
cities are regions of innovation and high-technology clusters that exceed the national
average in number of people with bachelor degrees; diversity and inclusiveness to all
races, ethnicities and walks of life; and attract members of the creative class (Florida
2003). Florida (2003) describes the aforementioned characteristics as the three  T’s:  
technology, talent and tolerance. Cities  with  high  percentages  of  the  three  T’s  attract  
members of the creative class. Creative class members include but are not limited to:
university professors, scientists, engineers, writers, artists, entertainers, and architects.
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Members of the creative class place a higher value on where they live than the job itself
and will move based on lifestyle confident economic opportunities will follow. Creative
cities are also susceptible to high levels of income inequality
Metropolitan areas experiencing below average growth and have weaker
economies are less likely to suffer from high levels of income inequality. The Brookings
Institution (2010) classified metros below the national average in population growth,
educational attainment and diversity as    “Industrial  Cores.” These cities have less
educational and income inequality because they have not attracted new residents and
continue to rely on industrial employment. Industrial core metros have older populations
than other metropolitan areas. It is my assumption that the lack of in-migration, combined
with an older existing population reduces mobility within the metropolitan area and
makes them less likely to experience an increase in concentration of income groups.
Population growth is closely aligned with immigrant populations. Immigrants
constituted more than 11 percent of the United States population in 2000 and play an
important role in metropolitan development (Singer 2004; Fishman 2005). Immigration –
the (in)ability to attract immigrants to a city – is  a  key  factor  in  the  classification  of  “Next  
Frontier”  and  “Industrial  Cores”  metropolitan  areas.  The  growing  population  and  above
national  average  diversity  in  “Next  Frontier”  metros  is  related  to  their  ability  to  attract  
immigrants.  Likewise,  “Industrial  Cores”  lack  of  diversity  and  stagnant  population  
growth in the past 20 years is the result of their inability to attract immigrant population.
The four metropolitan areas included in this thesis exhibiting strong growth
patterns  over  the  past  20  years,  Austin,  Denver,  Seattle,  and  Washington,  DC,  are  “Next  
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Frontier”  metropolitan  areas  and  creative  cities.  Each  of these metropolitan areas has had
high immigration rates since the 1980s (Singer 2004). The four metropolitan areas
included in this thesis exhibiting weaker growth, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and
Memphis,  are  “Industrial  Cores”  metropolitan  areas.  These  metropolitan  areas, aside
from Memphis, have low immigration rates after periods of high immigration in the early
20th Century.
Government is not an autonomous bystander to metropolitan development or
income disparities (Fainstein et al. 1992). The ability and ease with which affluent
populations are able to segregate from those in poverty is strongly influenced by
legislative action. Many of the policies promoting segregation were racially centered, but
their  legacy  remains  imprinted  on  today’s  metropolitan  landscape.  Their proliferation is
visible  through  the  dichotomous  locations  of  the  rich  and  poor.  The  federal  government’s  
homeownership policies in the middle of the 20th century targeted a particular class, race
and location that continue to influence the metropolitan landscape. The federal
government promoted homeownership on the periphery and simultaneously fostered the
concentration of poverty through high-density housing projects for low-income families
(Massey and Denton 1993). The FHA legalized redlining and encouraged racially
homogenous neighborhoods. Combined with Urban Renewal and the Interstate, whites
moved to suburban areas as blacks were relegated to inner cities. Today, the mortgage
interest deduction continues to incentivize economically homogenous neighborhoods.
Given the lack of research on the segregation of affluence, the following section
illustrates how the federal government promotes a spatial division of social groups and
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entices  affluent  populations  to  separate.  These  examples  illustrate  how  the  “rich
command  space  and  the  poor  are  trapped  in  it”  (Harvey  1973, 171).
Federal Policies and Segregation: FHA and Mortgage Interest Deductions
No  federal  housing  policy  is  as  impactful  as  the  government  intervention  in  1934:  
the  establishment  of  the  Federal  Housing  Administration.  The  early  policies  and  practices  
of  the  FHA  laid  the  foundation  for  sprawling  metropolitan  regions  that  would  foster  
residential  segregation.  Segregation  is  amplified  through  sprawl  because  suburbanization  
enables  spatial  separation  between  populations  and  it  promotes  outward  expansion  and  
low-density  architecture  (Yang  and  Jargowsky  2006;;  Dwyer  2009).  Subsequent  policies  
only  reinforced  segregation  practices  until  Congress  passed  the  Fair  Housing  Act  in  1968.  
The  Housing  Act  of  1949  (Urban  Renewal)  and  The  Federal  Highway  Act  of  1956,  
coupled  with  the  rise  of  the  automobile  further  supported  suburban  development  (Lamb  
2005;;  Levy  2011).  Urban  Renewal  removed  ‘urban  blight’  to  pave  the  way  for  new  
highways  through  formerly  heterogeneous  neighborhoods.  The  displaced  populations  
were  often  relocated  into  public  housing  towers  that  “brought  about  a  geographic  
concentration  of  poverty  that  was  previously  unimaginable”  (Massey  and  Denton  1993,  
57).
The Federal Housing Administration was established to boost homeownership,
aid foreclosure prevention and stimulate residential construction (Massey and Denton
1993; Hays 1995; Levy 2011). Its primary role to insure home mortgages transformed
homeownership. Today, a 30-year loan with a 20 percent or less at time of purchase is
common practice, yet prior to 1934 it was a remote possibility (Massey and Denton
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1993). The quick success encouraged Congress to continue expansion and create the
Federal National Mortgage Association, Fannie Mae, establishing a secondary mortgage
market that provided banks risk aversion and more cash on hand (Hays 1995).
It was not the insurance that promoted segregation, but the FHA requirements for
each individual property. FHA-insured mortgages drastically favored new, low-density,
single-family housing (Massey and Denton 1993; Lamb 2005).  The  FHA’s  valuation  
system placed an emphasis on stability, which in the eyes of the FHA were economic and
racially homogeneous neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Meyer 2000). Racial
and ethnically mixed neighborhoods located in the urban centers were devalued (Massey
and Denton 1993). FHA mortgages promoted new houses for middle-income, white
families and actively discouraged supporting multi-family housing. African Americans
were left in dilapidated housing in central cities, unable to secure loans. The FHA was
redlining (Saltman 1990).
The FHA coerced local officials into implementing zoning policies desired by
federal leaders via a financing mechanism in high demand (Whittemore 2013).
Homeownership became the instrument for cities to attract people and increase their tax
base. Homeownership grew from 44 to 63% between 1934 and 1972. Had the FHA
promoted  mixed  used,  dense  development,  America’s  urban  fabric  would  be  vastly
different.
The fragmentation of social groups across urban spaces may be the lasting impact
of the Federal Housing Administration. Through homeownership priorities, the FHA
strongly influenced the organization of race and class in US metro areas; those influences
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on the metropolitan landscape remain visible today. Redlining is no longer legal but the
federal tax code, indirectly, continues to incentivize social division. The mortgage
interest deduction influences housing choices and is the most expensive housing related
policy in the US federal budget. This tax expenditure contributes to the spatial and
economic gap between low and high-income populations. The diminished number of
middle-income households intensifies the importance of neighborhood composition.
‘Government  housing’  is  not  a  term  of  endearment  in  American  society  and  
generally refers to low-income housing, however, whether it matches the stigma or not, I
argue most  Americans  live  in  ‘government  housing.’  Owning  a  home  is  considered  a  
symbol of independence and the foundation of the American Dream, yet, the home
mortgage interest deduction reduces federal government revenues $82 billion annually. In
comparison, the 2012 budget for the Department of Housing and Urban Development
was $40.1 billion (OMB 2013a; OMB 2013b).
Tax expenditures are “provisions in the tax code that provide special tax benefits
for selected taxpayers” (Baneman et al. 2012, 1). Tax expenditures incentivize people or
businesses to engage in a particular behavior to reduce taxable income. One type of
incentive is a deduction, which allows people to subtract specific expenses from their
taxable income. With a 65% homeownership rate, the home mortgage interest deduction
is available to the majority of Americans (Callis and Kreslin 2013).
A range of familial needs and preferences influence people’s  housing  choice,  but  
income is instrumental. Jobs, schools, or transportation may be the deciding factor, but
except those with extraordinary financial resources, income is the principal factor of
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neighborhood selection (Reardon & Bishchoff 2011b). As of 2006, more than 70 percent
of people did not file itemized deductions (Lowenstein 2006). Although many
homeowners  may  not  take  advantage  of  the  deduction,  it  is  clear  the  rich  do.  “More  than  
80% of taxpayers in the top quintile itemized deduction in 2011, compared with just 16
percent of those in the bottom four quintiles”  (Baneman  et  al.  2012, 11). Wealthy
households invest in mansions because the tax code encourages them to direct capital
there (Lowenstein 2006). According to the Tax Foundation (2006), despite constituting
less than 9 percent of tax filers, taxpayers with incomes greater than $100,000 accounted
for almost 40% of the home mortgage interest deduction in 2003.
The home mortgage interest deduction is not the silver bullet to a middle class
lifestyle, but the tax code explicitly values homeownership over renting. Although
roughly  half  of  the  nation’s  homeowners  may  fail  to  capitalize  on  the  deduction,  no  tax  
instrument is in place to incentivize renting. The home mortgage interest deduction may
not be the reason someone buys a house, but at the cost of over $80 billion per year, it
greatly subsidizes homeownership and favors the affluent. This economic incentive is
location specific – affordable only on the periphery in many cities – and contributes to
the concentration of rich and poor. Homeownership rates influence appraisal values and
therefore homeowners seeking to protect or increase their greatest financial asset locate in
homogenous neighborhoods.
Homeownership in America is suburban phenomenon. Economist Edward
Glaeser (2011) argues homeownership subsidies and highway investment contribute to a
socially engineered suburbia and encourages people to flee dense urban areas. Between
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1940 and 1960, the homeownership rate jumped from 44 percent to 62 percent (Census
2011). The mortgage interest deduction did not create suburban homeownership, but does
augment the legacy of preceding federal policies such as the FHA and the Federal
Highway Act to influence the social division of urban space (Lamb 2005). As
neighborhoods become more economically uniform, the role of jobs, schools and
transportation grow in importance. The concentration of public goods in a smaller
number of neighborhoods increases the value of each place, reinforcing the economic and
spatial divides.
Kneebone & Berube (2013) point  out  that  many  ‘place-based’  policies  exist  to  
alleviate poverty. HUD is not alone; it combines efforts with the Department of
Education, Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Transportation.
Kneebone and Berube (2013) group these efforts into three categories: improving
neighborhoods, delivering services and expanding opportunity. These policies try to
improve physical and economic environments in low-income neighborhoods, provide
services to the residents, and diversify options for low-income people. The efforts and
programs, as described by Kneebone and Berube (2013) totaled $82 billion in 2012,
equal to the home mortgage interest deduction.
Homes  are  many  people’s  most  valuable  asset  and  eliminating  the  home  mortgage  
interest deduction would be a political challenge, however, an examination of housing
policy line items reveals the biggest contributor to deficits is not spending. According to
Kneebone  and  Berube  (2013),  HUD’s  budget  combined  with  all  other  place-based
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poverty programs equals the cost of mortgage interest deduction, a tax expenditure most
beneficial to wealthy households.
The FHA and mortgage interest deduction are two examples of policies that
contribute to residential sorting and the current organization of urban space. As these
lasting effects are present, there is also a geographical shift in poverty that requires policy
makers to assess the effectiveness of current place based poverty programs. After an
encouraging decline of poverty in the 1990s, poverty rates increased in the 2000s.
Potentially the most startling revelation about the increase in poverty is that the majority
concentrated in suburban areas. This shift has broad implications and requires policy
makers to think about new strategies to meet the needs of suburbanizing poverty.
The Suburbanization of Poverty, 1990-2010
A  new  geography  of  poverty  emerged  in  the  1990s.  As  concentrated  poverty  
declined  in  central  cities,  suburban  areas  captured  a  greater  share  of  poor  people.  The  
population  living  in  high  poverty  neighborhoods  declined  by  2.5  million  between  1990  
and  2000,  a  staggering  40  percent  (Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).    In  
addition,  the  total  number  of  high  poverty  areas  shrank  from  3,417  in  1990  to  2,510  in  
2000  (Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).    People  were  not  only  escaping  
poverty  on  an  individual  level,  they  were  less  likely  to  be  surrounded  by  others  in  
poverty.    Berube  and  Frey  (2002)  found  that  51  percent  of  central  cities  in  metropolitan  
areas  of  over  500,000  people  experienced  a  decline  in  poverty,  an  astonishing  shift  from  
the  1980’s  when  poverty  increased  in  over  three-fourths  of  the  same  cities.  
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Amidst  the  good  news,  poverty  increased  in  suburbs  during  the  1990s,  especially  
near  central  cities  and  in  large  metropolitan  areas  (Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  
2003;;  Cooke  2010).  Despite  total  suburban  population  growing  at  nearly  twice  the  rate  of  
central  cities,  the  share  of  the  poor  population  in  suburban  areas  increased  from  46  to  49  
percent  between  1990  and  2000  (Berube  and  Frey  2002).  For  the  first  time  in  over  50  
years,  the  poverty  rate  in  inner  ring  suburbs  and  the  poverty  rate  in  central  cities  moved  
in  opposite  directions  (Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  2003).    Although  suburban  
areas  absorbed  a  greater  share  of  the  impoverished  population,  the  poverty  rate  of  central  
cities,  18.4%,  remained  higher  than  the  8.3%  poverty  rate  in  suburban  areas.
The  suburbanization  of  poverty  insinuates  low-income  individuals  are  moving  
closer  to  opportunity,  but  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  had  little  effect  on  the  spatial  
proximity  to,  and  segregation  of  affluence  (Dwyer  2009).  Although  poverty  grew  in  
suburban  areas,  affluence  continued  to  move  toward  the  periphery.  Data  revealed  a  
reduction  in  the  spatial  distance  to  more  advantaged  populations,  but  the  majority  of  the  
decline  came  between  poor  and  near  poor  populations  (Dwyer  2009).  Poverty  became  
less  concentrated  in  the  1990s  because  of  income  mobility  (Wagmiller  2011).  Income  
mobility  theories  stress  changes  in  poverty  concentration  are  short  term  and  the  result  of  
changes  in  the  economy.
At  the  turn  of  the  21st  Century,  data  showed  that  the  concentration  of  poverty  in  
America  was  decreasing.  The  number  of  high  poverty  areas  declined  for  the  first  time  in  
30  years  and  the  majority  of  central  cities  experienced  a  reduction  in  poverty  rates  from  
the  previous  decade,  however,  new  concerns  and  problems  emerged  in  the  midst  of  this  
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change.  The  gains  made  in  the  urban  core  were  at  the  expense  of  the  suburban  areas  
(Berube  and  Frey  2002;;  Jargowsky  2003;;  Cooke  and  Marchant  2006).  American  suburbs,  
particularly  the  inner  ring  suburbs  near  the  urban  fringe,  experienced  an  increase  in  both  
total  poor  population  and  poverty  rate.  
Data released in the early 2000s showed the reemergence of concentrated poverty
(Berube and Kneebone 2006; Kneebone and Garr 2010a; Kneebone et al. 2011; Lichter et
al. 2012). Between 2000 and 2005-09, poverty levels began to rise again and 10.5 percent
of poor people lived in neighborhoods with a poverty rate of 40 percent or more, an
increase from 9.1 percent in 2000 (Kneebone et al. 2011).
Potentially  the  most  striking  revelation  about  the  increase  in  poverty  is  that  the  
majority  occurred  in  suburban  areas,  not  in  the  urban  core.  The  rise  of  poverty  in  inner  
ring  suburbs  experienced  during  the  1990s  continued.  As  early  as  2005,  data  indicated  
that  1  million  more  poor  people  lived  in  suburban  areas  than  in  central  cities  (Berube  and  
Kneebone  2006),  “suburbs  were  home  to  the  largest  and  fastest-growing  poor  population  
in  the  country”  (Kneebone  and  Garr  2010a,  4).  Population  in  extreme  poverty  
neighborhoods  increased  by  41  percent  in  suburban  areas,  compared  to  17  percent  in  
central  cities.  Overall,  poverty  gains  made  during  the  1990s  were  largely  negated  as  both  
cities  and  suburbs  experienced  an  increase  in  poverty.  Poverty  levels  in  central  cities  did  
not  return  to  pre-1990  levels,  but  the  trend  turned  in  an  unfortunate  direction.  (Kneebone  
et  al.  2011;;  Lichter  et  al.  2012).  As  a  nation,  the  population  living  in  extreme-poverty  
neighborhoods  rose  by  one  third  between  2000  and  2005-2009.    The  population  in  
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extreme-poverty  neighborhoods  rose  more  than  twice  as  fast  in  suburbs  as  in  cities  during  
this  time  period  (Kneebone  et  al.  2011).
The  suburbanization  of  poverty  does  not  equate  to  a  decline  in  poverty,  an  easing  
of  the  problem  or  a  solution  to  poverty.  Poverty  moving  to  the  suburbs  does  not  mean  
low-income  individuals  have  arrived  in  the  land  of  opportunity,  rather  it  means  
perceptions  about  the  location  of  opportunity  need  to  change.  Kneebone  and  Berube  
(2013)  argue  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  is  neither  good  nor  bad,  only  that  this  new  
geography  calls  for  new  ideas,  approaches  and  initiatives.  
Many  of  the  current  place-based  policies  are  not  designed  to  fight  poverty  in  this  
new  location.  Suburban  jurisdictions  are  experiencing  high  rates  of  poverty  for  the  first  
time  and  these  municipalities  are  not  equipped  to  meet  the  new  challenges.  Suburban  
areas  rely  on  property  taxes  for  revenues,  and  as  lower-income  populations  grow,  these  
revenues  will  decline  as  the  need  for  social  services  rise  (Madden  2003;;  Cooke  2010;;  
Berube  and  Kneebone  2013).  Leaders  must  continually  evaluate  policies  and  the  
implementation  of  policies  to  meet  the  challenges  associated  with  the  suburbanization  of  
poverty.  As  Dwyer’s  (2009)  research  illustrates,  the  suburbanization  of  poverty  has  not  
placed  low-income  populations  in  the  heart  of  economic  opportunity.  Rather,  the  
suburbanization  of  poverty  is  pushing  disadvantaged  populations  into  new  municipalities  
that  now  must  find  ways  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  growing  low-income  population.
The suburbanization of poverty alters our perceptions and the reality about the
geography of poverty within metropolitan areas. The new location means low-income
families are not only occupying new houses and neighborhoods, but also new
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municipalities. This potentially requires individuals to enroll in new social service
programs and meet new administrators, if programs for low-income populations even
exist in these suburban jurisdictions. This geographical shift presents challenges for
citizens and public officials at all levels of government.
The metropolitan area is a multi-layered geographic and political boundary; the
contemporary US city is ‘chaotic  and  random’  (Boschmann  and  Kwan  2010).  Discussing  
the suburbanization of poverty requires a detailed explanation and understanding of the
changing metropolitan area. As poverty becomes a suburban phenomenon, it is important
to relay how previous scholars analyzed the changing geography of poverty and affluence
in metropolitan areas.
Suburban Typology
The evolution of United States metropolitan areas during the 20th century makes
the simple urban-suburban division ineffective. Despite changes, many continue to
perceive suburbs as home to the nuclear family with white picket fences and fertile
ground for the American Dream. Much can be said about this transformation, but the
point is to merely illustrate the  “Leave it to Beaver”  suburban  oasis  is  not true for all
suburban places and because the clear urban-suburban divide no longer exists, there is no
simple way to discuss the geography of metropolitan areas. Central city-suburb
dichotomous analysis does not respond to the array of socio-economic variables in
metropolitan areas (Lee 2011). Discrepancies between suburbs can, and do, eclipse the
differences of the central city and suburbs. Suburban areas now compete with one another
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for jobs, amenities and people, and have diverse populations and functions (Mikelbank
2004). Categorizing suburban areas as  simply  ‘not  central  city’  is imprecise.
The Brookings Institution categorizes suburban places based on urbanization rate
of the counties within a metropolitan area (Broookings 2010; Kneebone et al. 2011). This
approach divides areas outside the central city as high-density suburbs, mature suburbs,
emerging suburbs and exurbs. High density suburbs are where more than 95 percent of
the population lived in an urbanized area in 2000; mature suburbs is 75 to 95 percent;
emerging suburbs is between 25 and 75 percent and finally; exurbs are areas with
urbanization rates below 25 percent in 2000.
Focusing on the physical landscape of high-poverty areas as opposed to
jurisdictional lines accounts for regional variability across a metropolitan area and eases
comparative urban analysis (Cooke 2010). Cooke and Marchant (2006) classified
metropolitan areas based on age and density of the housing stock rather than use
jurisdictional boundaries (later used by Lee 2011). The Sun Belt has low-density central
cities (Jacksonville, FL) that appear suburban while inner-ring suburbs in northeastern
cities (Hartford, CT) share similar housing characteristics to central cities (Cooke and
Marchant 2006). Many areas outside Hartford appear more urban than areas within the
Jacksonville city limits. Cooke  and  Marchant’s (2006) approach highlights the challenges
facing federal officials charged with allocating funds from the federal government to
address problems on the local level. Cooke and Marchant’s  (2006)  approach  raises  
questions of whether poverty is responsive to physical landscape, jurisdictional lines,
both, or neither.
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This project aims to further the understanding of changing suburban realities. The
research on income groups, and their spatial location, performed in this study potentially
serve as valuable information to further describe the differences between suburban areas.
The changing geography of poverty within US metropolitan areas further illustrates the
complexity of the metropolitan landscape and demonstrates the importance of suburban
understanding when discussing the changing spatial patterns of income groups. The
suburbanization of poverty is an example of a spatial socioeconomic change on the
national level, yet questions remain about the influence economic and population growth
has on income segregation, specifically, the spatial patterns of affluence and poverty
within metropolitan areas.
Hypothesis
This thesis focuses on four metropolitan areas (Austin, Denver, Seattle, and
Washington, DC) considered to be economically successful and four cities (Buffalo,
Cleveland, Detroit, and Memphis) with weaker economic and population growth in effort
to answer: Do cities with strong economic and population growth exhibit different
patterns of income segregation than cities with weak economic and population
growth?
This research will use a multi-method approach to analyze the segregation of
fragmented income groups in an attempt to answer: What are the trends of residential
segregation by income between 1990 and 2010, and how have spatial patterns
changed during that time?
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My hypothesis is that stronger metropolitan areas are more segregated than
weaker growing metropolitan areas. I anticipate the stronger metropolitan areas had lower
levels of segregation of poverty and affluence in the 1990s than weaker metropolitan
areas, but that segregation levels increased in stronger metropolitan areas while
segregation has remained stable over the twenty-year period in weaker metro areas (Lee
2011). Following the conclusions of Reardon and Bischoff (2011) and Dwyer (2009), I
predict the segregation of affluence grew in both groups of cities, however, I anticipate
the rate of growth to be much faster in the strong growing metropolitan areas. As the
stronger metropolitan areas experienced a significant amount of growth in the past twenty
years, higher levels of income inequality accompanied this growth. This leads me to
believe there will be an increase in the segregation of affluence and segregation of
poverty.
I anticipate poverty moves toward the urban fringe in the majority of metros, as
suggested by national trends, and affluent neighborhoods will emerge in areas near the
urban core by 2010, and continue along the periphery. Stronger metro areas are more
likely to witness a growth of affluence in the near urban areas because of their ability to
attract new residents that are highly educated, well paid and seeking a vibrant urban
lifestyle (Florida 2003). Weaker metros are less likely to experience significant changing
patterns of poverty or affluence because of their stable populations and lower
susceptibility to growing income inequality. I believe the weak metros will see a growing
number of high poverty neighborhoods extending from the central city into the suburban
areas and that areas of affluence will be concentrated far from the urban center.
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Scholars continually wrestle with the best method to measure segregation. The
proliferation of new methods is never ending. Prior to discussing the methodology I
incorporated in this study, I believe it is important to provide a brief history of different
segregation approaches. Also, I point out the limitations of methods of these fundamental
methods.
Approaches to measuring segregation
Segregation is an intuitive idea, yet measuring it is a challenge and too complex a
problem to analyze in one way (Massey and Denton 1988; Rey and Folch 2011, Ades et
al. 2012). Residential segregation can be assessed as the degree of spatial separation of
two groups across an urban space. Generally, segregation is assessed longitudinally in
one place or in multiple places at one time, yet all segregation measures seek to
understand location choices of different populations over place or time (Rey and Folch
2011).
There are two common approaches used to measure segregation: segregation
indices and mapping neighborhoods at a particular threshold of poverty and/or affluence
(Ades et al. 2012). Recently, spatial statistics emerged as a third approach to study
segregation due to the advancement of geographic information systems, and the
importance of understanding the spatial processes of residential segregation. Although
these are the predominant methods, the practices of each approach are not uniform. The
purpose of the following section is to demonstrate the variety of existing approaches to
measure segregation and provide context for the methods ultimately selected in this
study.
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Segregation Indices
Familiarity with the term segregation masks the complexities that arise when
trying to measure it. The most well-known and widely used measure of segregation is the
dissimilarity index developed by Duncan and Duncan in 1955 (Massey and Denton 1988;
Rey and Folch 2011; Spivak et al. 2011; Ades et al. 2012). The dissimilarity index
remained the standard measure of segregation until the 1970s (Massey and Denton 1988).
Criticism of the index did not necessarily produce a better model, yet did reignite the
debate of how to best measure segregation. The debate continued until the late 1980s
when Massey and Denton (1988) identified and evaluated more than 20 segregation
indices and established five dimensions: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization
and clustering.
Each dimension of segregation is measured by a unique index. Evenness,
measured by the dissimilarity index, describes the distribution of two social groups across
a study area. The dissimilarity index denotes the percentage of the minority population
that must change neighborhoods to attain an even distribution. Exposure explains the
contact one group has with another and represents the average social experience of a
resident (Spivak et al. 2011). Two indices measure exposure: the isolation index and
interaction index. The two indices are inverses of one another and sum to 1. The isolation
index ranges from 0 to 1 and shows the percentage of the neighborhood occupied by the
minority group. If a study area has an isolation value of 1, the minority group is
completely isolated. The interaction index illustrates the exposure the minority group has
with the non-minority group. A lower number illustrates less exposure to the non30

minority, and therefore more segregation (Spivek et al. (2011). The two indices are
interchangeable and should be considered equally (Massey and Denton 1988).
Evenness  and  exposure  are  aspatial,  but  three  of  Massey  and  Denton’s  (1988)  
dimensions are spatial. Concentration measures the amount of physical area the minority
group occupies within the study area in relation to their proportion of the population.
Centralization refers to the proximity of the minority group to the core of an urban area.
Finally, clustering analyzes if minority groups occupy a contiguous area or are dispersed
throughout the study area.
Using factor analysis, Massey and Denton (1988) determine evenness and
exposure explain the majority of the variance among the five measures but given the
multidimensionality of segregation, each measure provides valuable information for a
comprehensive understanding of residential segregation. The extensive usage and various
combinations of these indices demonstrate their acceptance within segregation research.
Ross et al. (2004) and Ades et al. (2012) used all five dimensions to study the segregation
of poverty in Canadian metropolitan areas. Others limit their scope and rely on the
classical dimensions of evenness or exposure in combination with other indices (Lee
2011; Rey and Folch 2011; Spivak et al. 2011). Finally, Dwyer (2009) studied the spatial
dimension of segregation and used concentration, centralization and clustering. Despite
their wide use, there are limitations to the various indices. The first criticism is the
applicability to measuring income as a variable and secondly, a combination of two ideas:
some of the dimensions are aspatial, and each produces only a single index value.
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Massey and Denton (1988) established the five dimensions to measure the racial
segregation of two groups: black and white. Because income is a variable on a continuous
scale, applying these measures to income segregation requires dividing income into
categories such as poor-nonpoor, based off of arbitrary decisions (Jargowsky 1996; Rey
and Folch 2011). To accounts for  income’s  continuous  nature  Jargowsky (1996)
developed the Neighborhood Sorting Index (NSI), which compares the standard deviation
of  an  individual  household’s income to the standard deviation of neighborhood income.
While the motivation to develop NSI is clear and the model is theoretically
straightforward, Jargowsky (1996) notes there are data limitations; because the Census
releases income distribution in categories, assumptions must be made to calculate total
variance of neighborhoods and households (Watson 2009). Although the NSI offers a
solution to the categorical problems, it is an imperfect model with data limitations.
Two additional shortcomings are that segregation indices yield only a single value
and that they provide limited to no spatial information. First, two of the dimensions –
evenness and exposure – are aspatial. Second, the single value, a global statistic, is
problematic for the spatial dimensions of clustering, centralization and concentration
because the patterns of segregation for the entire study area are aggregated into one
number. A global statistic provides limited information about the spatial location of
segregation, “The single index number is the result of many spatial decisions made by
people far removed  from  the  residents  under  study”  (Rey and Folch 2011, 431). The
global statistic makes it challenging to understand where segregation is occurring.
Global tests indicate the segregation of a population across the entire area of study; local
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tests allow the opportunity to interpret where clusters are taking place (Hong and
O’Sullivan  2012). Residential segregation is studied through the lens of multiple
disciplines and although many indices used do not reflect this fact, residential segregation
is inherently spatial (Rey and Folch 2011). Geography must play a role in segregation
research (Johnston et al. 2009).
Map High & Extreme Income Group Neighborhoods
Mapping concentrated income neighborhoods, the second most common approach
to studying segregation, makes visualizing the location of concentrated income
neighborhoods easy. The crux of this method involves identifying neighborhoods with a
particular percentage of their population in poverty or affluence. Scholars who map
concentrated income neighborhoods (census tracts) have mostly been concerned with the
distribution of poverty across an urban area (Jargowsky 2003; Kingsley and Petit 2003;
Cooke and Marchant 2006; Kneebone et al. 2011; Wagmiller 2011; Lichter et al. 2012).
Only Brinegar and Leonard (2008) incorporated this approach to the segregation of
poverty and affluence.
One criticism of this method overlaps with the indices – establishing  ‘poor’  and  
‘non-poor’ neighborhoods requires subjective decision-making (Ades et al. 2012).
Further, the thresholds used to classify neighborhoods are inconsistent. Thresholds used
to identify high-poverty neighborhoods include 30% (Wilson 1987; Kingsley and Petit
2003; Cooke and Marchant 2006; Wagmiller 2011) and 40% (Jargowsky 2003). Finally,
others elected to use two thresholds, 20% and 40% to identify high- and extreme-poverty
neighborhoods. (Brinegar and Leonard 2008; Kneebone et al. 2011).
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Spatial Statistics
In addition to the standard approaches, spatial statistics, powered by GIS have
emerged as a new tool to investigate residential segregation. Spatial statistics respond to
the  limitations  of  Massey  and  Denton’s  spatial  dimensions  and  provide  a  platform  to  
visualize segregation (Johnston et al. 2009). Given  indices’  inability  to  provide  detailed  
spatial information about where segregation is occurring, Johnston et al. (2009) call for
scholars focused on residential segregation to place more of an emphasis on spatial
location,  “[a]  fuller,  more  informative  discussion  of  segregation  levels  need  more
geography”  (Johnston  et  al.  2009,  91).  This argument centers on the shortcomings of
global statistics and aspatial indices. Johnston et al. (2009) use the Getis-Ord Gi* local
statistic to evaluate ethnic segregation in Auckland, New Zealand. Hong and  O’Sullivan  
(2012) use the Getis-Ord Gi* to compare a heuristic algorithm designed to measure
clustering. Their selection of Gi* illustrates its broad acceptance as a local statistic used
to evaluate clustering.
Local statistics are derivatives of global statistics, but used to analyze each spatial
unit  in  a  study  area.  Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  a  local  statistic  of  Global  Moran’s  I  
(Anselin 1995). Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure of spatial autocorrelation – it evaluates the
clustering of both high and low values. In short, it evaluates the relative location of a
point and its neighbors, in a multidimensional fashion. According to ArcGIS 10.1 help,
Moran’s  I  is an inferential statistic that should be examined through z-scores and in
relation to the null hypothesis. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates spatial
patterns of the dataset are a random process. A statistically significant value indicates
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either clustering or dispersal beyond random processes. If the z-score is positive, we
reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than can
be expected from a true random process. However, if a z-score is negative, we can also
reject the null hypothesis, but in this case because the high and low values are more
dispersed than would be expected from a random selection.
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected
distribution.
The Getis-Ord General G, an additional global statistic, measures if high or low
values cluster. The General G is a measure of hot or cold-spots over a space. The General
G interprets values in relation to the expected value. Higher values than expected reveal
potential hot-spots, and cold-spots indicate a clustering of low values. Like  the  Moran’s  I,  
the General G is an inferential statistic evaluated in terms of a null hypothesis. The null
hypothesis of the General G is there is no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a
significant z-score we are able to reject the null hypothesis; however we reject the null
hypothesis for different reasons if the z-score is positive or negative. A statistically
significant positive z-score indicates high values are more clustered than can be expected
from a truly random sample. Statistically significant negative z-scores indicate the lowvalues are spatially clustered more than can be expected from a truly random sample.
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Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots,
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. This clustering is
determined by the z-score. A positive z-score indicates clustering of high-values where as
a low z-score indicates a clustering of low values.
In the following section, I discuss how I incorporated these methods into my
research, and describe other key methodological decisions.
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Chapter Three: Methods
The methods section is organized as follows: data, explanation of the three
segregation approaches, and the criteria for selecting metropolitan areas. The first section
outlines data collection and manipulation, and specific steps to complete each
methodological approach. I discuss the data sources, selection of variables, and provide
detail about addressing the analytical problem of changing census tract boundaries.
Following is an explanation of the key steps to complete each methodological approach:
segregation indices, concentrated income neighborhoods and spatial statistics.
Data
I used census tract level data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, and the
2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) to compare the longitudinal changes of
income segregation across the metropolitan areas of Austin, Denver, Seattle, Washington,
DC, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and Memphis. The 2006-2010 American Community
Survey serves in place of 2010 decennial census because the Census Bureau no longer
collects socioeconomic characteristics as a part of the decennial census.
The number of individuals in poverty and total number of individuals in a census
tract were the key variables I used for low-income populations. To analyze affluent
populations, I used household data and considered the top income bracket for each
dataset to be affluent. For 1990, the top category was household income greater than
$150,000, and in 2000 and 2010 the top category was household income greater than
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$200,000.  This  categorization  of  affluence  follows  Brinegar  and  Leonard’s  (2008)  
approach.
Due to available datasets, low-income and high-income data were collected from
different sources. The source for low-income data in 1990, 2000 and 2010 was the
Longitudinal Tract Database (LTDB), available from the Census Bureau. The LTDB is a
public database hosted on the Census website provided to aid researchers performing
longitudinal census tract analysis (Logan et al. 2014). The LTDB provides an extensive
amount of data from the 1970 Census through the 2006-10 ACS, all modified to 2010
boundaries.
The LTDB data include individuals in poverty and the population of each census
tract. Due to the availability of low-income in this dataset, and more importantly the 1990
and 2000 data being modified to 2010 census tracts, significant manipulation of data for
low-income data analysis was not required. High-income data, however, required
significant adjustment prior to analysis.
Although the LTDB is an extensive dataset, it does not include household income
or affluence data, therefore my sources of high-income data from 1990, 2000 and 2010
are distinctive. Each dataset required unique manipulation in order to attain uniformity
among the three decades and meet the requirement of all statistical approaches.
Household income data for 2000 and 2010 were collected from the Census website. 1990
data were collected from the National Historical Geographic Information System from
the Minnesota Population Center (2011) (used by Reardon and Bischoff 2011b) because I
was unable able to locate 1990 household income information at the census tract level
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from the census website. It is not uncommon for scholars to mix data sources when
performing longitudinal analysis in segregation literature (Reardon and Bischoff 2011).
The NHGIS includes the complete Summary File-3 dataset.
The NHGIS 1990 data required the most attention because the original data did
not include conventional Federal Information Processing – commonly known as FIPS –
formatting.  Common  FIPS  formatting  is  ‘SSCCCTTTTTT’  where  SS  =  state,  CCC  =  
county and TTTTTT = census tract (Logan et al. 2014). The NHGIS dataset included the
correct number, but not proper formatting. For example, the NHGIS labels census tract
‘9.02’  as  ‘902’  but  conventional  formatting  is  ‘000902’.  NHGIS  also  labels  census  tract  
‘902’  as  ‘902’  but  conventional  formatting  is  ‘090200’.  In  an  11-character string,
placeholders are imperative. The NHGIS also failed to follow conventional FIPS
formatting for states and counties. The three geographic areas (states, counties, tracts)
were separated into three columns in the original formatting. I modified each variable to
match conventional formatting and then concatenated the columns in order to produce a
conventional 11-character string.
As  for  2000  and  2010,  data  in  the  ‘Factfinder’  website  application  is  aggregated  to  
the county level. I selected all of the counties within each of the 2010 metropolitan areas
and acquired income data. I modified each dataset to contain uniform data. I downloaded
2000 and 2006-2010 data from the Census website; significant amounts of additional race
and socioeconomic data were included, however, the additional data varied within each
dataset, therefore, I deleted the superfluous data and my final database included only
household income and family income for 1990, 2000, and 2010. Household income data
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are divided  into  categories  such  as,  ‘Households  >  $200,000’.  The  number  of  households  
within each income category is presented as a count variable.
Although high-income data were not available in the LTBD, Logan et al. (2014)
provide  a  ‘crosswalk’  Microsoft  Access  database  that  interpolates  data  from  previous  
decades and normalizes it to the 2010 boundary. The crosswalk database requires an
input table, queries to identify variables, type of variable, and the program completes the
interpolation. After multiple attempts, I successfully inputted household income census
datasets from 1990 and 2000 into the crosswalk table for each metropolitan area. After
successful normalization to the 2010 boundaries, I exported the data from Microsoft
Access into Microsoft Excel and/or ArcGIS to run the statistical tests. Data from 2010
did not need interpolation because data were collected at 2010 boundaries.
A brief aside, although I used count data, a percentage was also included in each
of the original tables but percentages would be inaccurate if used in the interpolation
table. I could have retained the percentages for 2010 because it did not need to be
interpolated, but I believed it was more important to have uniform data in each table to
ensure later calculations were consistent. To illustrate the difference between data sources
in their original form, the 2000 data included over 200 records and 2010 data included
over 500 records. This disparity contributed to the emphasis on uniformity in this
longitudinal study.
Tract Boundary Changes: 1990-2010
Using census tracts for longitudinal studies can be problematic (Jargowsky 2003;
Logan et al. 2014). Census tracts are neighborhoods that consist of 4,000 people, on
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average. The Census Bureau draws tracts based on the population and as populations
change census tracts are dissolved, separated or modified. Various approaches exist to
address these challenges, but it is crucial to maintain a consistent number of census tracts
for each period of analysis because altering the number of tracts makes longitudinal
analysis inconsistent (Jargowsky 2003).
Changing census tract boundaries create analytical challenges and one approach is
to purchase the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) (Tatian 2003; Lee 2011). The
NCDB contains census data from 1970 through 2000 and normalizes all data to the 2000
boundary (Lee 2011). I did not select the NCDB as a data source because it does not
include 2010 data. According to the Census  Bureau’s  website,  the  solution  to  tract  
boundaries modification is areal interpolation. The Census Bureau provides the following
instruction: where a 2010 census tract is larger than a 2000 census tract, the solution is to
create a new record (polygon) and assign proportional attributes to the new polygon
based on the size of the 2010 polygon in relation to the 2000 polygon. The Census
Bureau provides 2000 to 2010 and 1990 to 2000 Census Tract Relationship Files to aid
this process.
In addition to this general instruction, the Census Bureau provides the
Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB). The LTDB uses areal interpretation to normalize
historic data to the 2010 boundary. For this reason, I used the 2010 Metropolitan
Statistical Area boundaries. Logan et al. (2014) write the 2000 to 2010 data comparison
has a high degree of accuracy but note the 1990 to 2010 data comparison has more
variability because it relies on land area interpolation. Its commercial counterpart,
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NCDB, interpolates data based on block group data. Because block groups are smaller
geographic areas than census tracts, allocating data at this smaller geographic scale
makes interpolation more accurate. Allocating a percentage of the larger geographic area
(census tract) reduces accuracy. Logan et al. (2014) do not make clear why there is more
variability in 1990 than 2000 but I assume the variability is a function of more boundary
changes due to more elapsed time.
Segregation Indices
I used five dimensions of segregation to analyze income segregation in these
metropolitan areas: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering.
Evenness is best measured by the dissimilarity index, the classic segregation measure
developed by Duncan and Duncan (1955). The isolation and interaction indices are both
appropriate measures of exposure (Massey and Denton 1988).
The dissimilarity index indicates the evenness of two groups and measures the
overrepresentation or underrepresentation in a spatial unit. The formula to measure
poverty is:
𝐷 =    .5 ∗   

  

𝑝𝑖
𝑥𝑖
−
  
𝑃
𝑋

where pi and xi are the number of poor and nonpoor individuals who live in
neighborhood i, and P and X are the number of poor and nonpoor who live in the MSA.
To measure affluence, pi and xi are substituted with number of affluent households and
number of non-affluent households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of
affluent households in the MSA.
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The isolation index is an experiential measure and indicates the probability that a
member of particular group shares the same spatial unit with a member of the same
group. The closer to 1, the more isolated a group is within that particular unit. The
formula to measure poverty is:
𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑃
𝑡𝑖

𝐼𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

where pi is the number of poor individuals who live in neighborhood i, P is the
total number of poor individuals who live in the MSA, and ti is the total number of
individuals who live in neighborhood i. To measure affluence, pi is the number of
affluent households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of affluent households in
the MSA.
The interaction index is the second index that measures exposure, and is the
inverse of the isolation index. When measuring the segregation of poverty, it measures
the average percentage of nonpoor individuals that share the spatial unit with individuals
in poverty. The formula to measure poverty is:
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =   

𝑝𝑖
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where pi and xi are the number of poor and nonpoor individuals who live in
neighborhood i, P is the total number of poor individuals who live in the MSA, and ti is
the total number of individuals who live in neighborhood i. To measure affluence, pi and
xi are substituted with number of affluent households and number of non-affluent
households in neighborhood i, and P is the total number of affluent households in the
MSA.
43

I performed all three segregation tests using Microsoft Excel and maintained
separate data tables of poverty and affluence for each metropolitan area. To measure the
segregation of poverty, I compared individuals in poverty to individuals not in poverty.
Likewise, to measure the segregation of affluence I compared affluent households to nonaffluent households. A direct comparison cannot be made between households and
individuals; therefore I was not able to compare affluent versus rich. Studying the
relationship of both poverty and affluence provides a comprehensive view of income
disparities. The majority of studies only focus on poverty through the poor-nonpoor
relationship. Although data limitations prevent a direct comparison, this research does
focus on both spectrums of the income continuum.
The three additional dimensions of segregation improve our spatial understand of
segregation. I originally calculated these variables in Microsoft Excel, as well, yet after
human error, I determined a more precise tool was the Geo-Segregation-Analyzer,
designed by Apparcio et al. (2014). This is an open-source application that calculates 43
different indices. I followed Ades et al. (2012) and used the Absolute Concentration
Index (ACO), Absolute Clustering Index (ACI), and Absolute Centralization Index
(ACE).
The ACO ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the physical space occupied by the
minority group. A value of 0 indicates minimal concentration, and 1 indicates maximum
concentration in the smallest geographic places. For poverty, the formula is:
∑
𝐴𝐶𝑂 = {

∑

𝑥𝐴
( 𝑋 ) −    ∑
𝑡𝐴
( 𝑇 ) −    ∑
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}
𝑡𝐴
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where 𝑥 is the total population of group X in spatial unit i, 𝑡 is the total
population in spatial unit i, Ai equals the surface are of spatial unit i, X is the total
population of group X in the metro area, 𝑇 is the cumulative sum of the 𝑡 in spatial units
from 1 to n1, and T2 is the cumulative sum of the ti in spatial units from n2 to n.
The ACL ranges from 0 to 1 and indicates how likely the minority group is to live
in adjoining spatial units. The closer to 1, the higher degree of clustering is present. The
formula is:
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where 𝑥 is the total population of group X in spatial unit i, 𝑐 is the value
of the cell of the of the total distance between i and j, X is the total population of group X
in the metro area, 𝑥 is the total population of group X in spatial unit j, 𝑡 is the total
population of in spatial unit j.
Lastly, The ACE ranges from -1 to 1 and measures how likely the minority group
is to the central city. A negative value indicates the group is dispersed from the central
city and 1 indicates the group is near the central city; a 0 indicates the group is randomly
dispersed. The value of 1 is given to all spatial units inside the central city. The formula
is:
𝐴𝐶𝐸 =

𝑋

𝑆
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−

𝑋𝑖𝑆

where 𝑋

is the cumulative proportion of group X in spatial unit i (from 1 to i)

and 𝑆 is the cumulative proportion of surface area of spatial unit i (from 1 to i)
Despite their value and prevalence in segregation research, segregation indices
fail to produce a clear spatial understanding about segregation in a metropolitan area. Rey
and Folch (2011) conclude that segregation measures are affected by changing spatial
configuration of data far removed from the data under study. For this reason, I use two
additional methods to visualize the spatial changes of poverty and affluence: map highand extreme-income neighborhoods, and use spatial statistics.
High- and Extreme-Income Neighborhoods
I mapped extreme-poverty neighborhoods (40% or greater) and high-poverty
neighborhoods (20-39%) following the approach of Brinegar and Leonard (2008) and
Kneebone et al. (2011). I chose to map both thresholds for two reasons: research up to
this point uses thresholds ranging from 20-40%; incorporating both into this study allows
my study to be compared with the larger body of research. Second, the difference
between a neighborhood with 39% poverty and one of 40% is minimal. Including both
groups make tracking neighborhoods near this threshold over time easier. Mapping the
two thresholds helps identify anomalies and provides two degrees of concentrated income
neighborhoods.
Affluent tracts are identified using the same cutoffs: for extreme-affluence
neighborhoods are classified as those with 40% or greater affluent households in a census
tract and high-affluence neighborhoods as tracts with 20-39% of the households in a
census tract with incomes greater than $150,000 or $200,000, depending on the year. As
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mentioned earlier, there is little attention on high-income households in segregation
literature, and I only found one article using this method to study the segregation of
affluence (Brinegar and Leonard 2008).
As mentioned earlier, I modified the datasets to include only count variables. I
manually calculated a poverty rate and an affluence rate for each census tract. I calculated
the poverty rate for each census tract by dividing the number of individuals in poverty by
the total population. I calculated the affluence rate for each census tract by dividing the
number of households in the top income category by the total number of households. In
my analysis, I present the total number of census tracts classified as high- or extreme
poverty/affluence. I calculated these numbers in ArcGIS 10.1.
Spatial Statistics
Lastly, I incorporated spatial statistics to analyze high and low-income groups in
the eight metropolitan areas. The emergence of spatial statistics to analyze residential
segregation is relatively new, thus I included multiple tests in effort to better understand
segregation in the eight metro areas and also add fresh analytical perspective to a field of
study that constantly wrestles with the most appropriate way to measure segregation. I
used  two  global  statistics,  Moran’s  I  and  Getis-Ord G, and two  local  statistics,  Anselin’s  
Local  Moran’s  I  and  Getis-Ord Gi* to analyze clustering of income groups.
All four of these statistics are standard in the ArcGIS 10.1 Spatial Statistics
Toolbox. I used the total number of people in poverty and total affluent households
within each census tract as my variable. Ultimately, I selected total number in each
census tract over the poverty or affluence rate within each tract because of the
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suburbanization of poverty literature. The ‘suburbanization of poverty’ refers to more
poor people living in suburban areas than in central cities despite the poverty rate
remaining higher in central cities. Given the higher density and higher poverty rates of
census tracts in central cities, I assumed an analysis of poverty rates clusters in the urban
core. Selecting the total number of people within each census tract shows where clusters
of people are in the metro, rather than the clusters of neighborhoods. Further, analyzing
the number of people rather than neighborhoods allows us to observe if a suburbanization
of poverty occurs in each metro. It is not my aim to predetermine results to match the
literature; rather, that my analysis accurately tests previous research and national trends.
Selecting the total number of individuals in poverty is a better test of the current
phenomena that is receiving significant attention in academic and mainstream journalism.
Given the limited research on the geography of affluence in the context of segregation
studies, any rebuttal on this front seemed speculative and a candidate for additional
research.
After identifying the variable, all four spatial statistics require a conceptualization
of spatial relationship and provides the option of establishing a distance band. Below is a
screenshot of options:

48

The conceptualization of spatial relationships used in this study was the zone of
indifference. The zone of indifference assigns an equal weight to all tracts within the
distance band and then diminishes as it moves away from that polygon (census tracts).
Therefore finite boundaries are not enacted with the introduction of the distance band.
I used a distance band of 2500 meters. Selecting the appropriate distance band
required exploration  and  it  appears  there  is  no  formula  to  select  a  ‘perfect’  distance  band.  
According to ArcGIS help resources, a combination of the k-function test and an
investigation of the minimum, maximum and average distance neighbors are each
important factors to evaluate. I also ran exploratory tests with Local Moran’s  I  Spatial  
Autocorrelation, testing distance bands of 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000 meters, to
determine which distance band yielded the highest z-score. After evaluating each of these
factors for all eight metropolitan areas, I selected 2500 meters. The average distance
between neighbors for the eight metro areas was 2111.6 meters. The average k-function
maximum clustering was 2625 meters.  Using  the  Moran’s  I  Spatial  Autocorrelation  for  
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distance bands of 2000 and 2500 meters, each metro area had a higher z-score at 2500
meters, except for Seattle, but the difference was minimal3.
Despite running four unique statistical tests, the parameters required for each test
are uniform. I selected the Zone of Indifference and used 2500 meters as a distance band
for all four statistical tests. The descriptions and intellectual merit of each analysis were
discussed earlier. Each of the measures was analyzed at the metropolitan level. Below is a
summation of how each metropolitan area was selected.
Metropolitan Area Selection Criteria
Richard  Florida’s  Creative  Class  in  2002,  his  updated  list  in  2012  and  “The  
Brookings  Institution  “State  of  Metropolitan  American  in  2010”  each  identify  
metropolitan areas with strong economies that successfully attract jobs, an educated
workforce and employers. I used these sources to develop the groups of metropolitan
areas included in this study because Florida and Brookings use distinct approaches aimed
at producing a list of successful, economically thriving, and forward-thinking
metropolitan areas.
Austin, Seattle and Washington, D.C. each appeared on all three lists. Denver
appeared as  a  “Next  Frontier”  city  and  on  Florida’s  inaugural list but not the updated
release in 2012. However, Boulder, CO – formerly a part of the Denver metro area – is
one  of  Florida’s  2012 creative cities. Although they are now in separate  MSA’s,  Boulder  
and Denver continue to share planning efforts within the region such as the regional
3

  Given  Johnston  et  al.  (2009)  use  of  1000  m  distance  band,  I  also  tested  1000m  and  1500  m  for  Denver.  
However,  the  z-scores  were  significantly  lower  at  this  distance.  My  assumption  is  the  difference  between  
Auckland’s  classification  of  meshblocks  and  US  census  tracts  may  be  the  key  reason.  However,  Johnston  et  
al.  (2009)  did  not  explain  their  reason  for  selection  and  I  therefore  used  the  general  research  on  distance  
band  selection  as  my  guide.
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transit network, FasTracks. Also, I am conducting my research at the University of
Denver.  Although  it  is  not  on  Florida’s  2012  list,  I  believe  it’s  proximity to Boulder and
appearance on the other two lists justifies its inclusion.
To find a comparison to the successful metropolitan areas, I turned to the
Brookings Report. “Industrial  Cores”  provide a nearly perfect  ‘opposite’  to  “Next  
Frontier”  metropolitan areas. The metropolitan areas are below the national average in
growth, education attainment and are less diverse. Additionally, these metropolitan areas
have less educational and income inequality.
Austin, Denver, Seattle and Washington, DC are popular immigrant destinations.
A 2004 report on immigration comparing historic immigrant patterns to current growth
rates ranked Austin, TX as a ‘pre-emerging’ immigrant gateway; Denver and Seattle as
‘re-emerging gateways’; and Washington, D.C. as an ‘emerging gateway’ (Singer 2004).
In sum, each of these metros is experiencing a period of rapid growth of immigrant
populations.  This  aligns  closely  with  the  narrative  of  ‘Next  Frontier’  metropolitan  areas.  
Three of the four metropolitan areas experiencing below average population and
economic  growth  are  classified  in  the  same  study  as  ‘Former-gateways’.  Buffalo,  
Cleveland and Detroit attracted immigrants in the early part of the 20th century, but now
have  low  immigration  rates.  The  lack  of  population  growth  in  ‘Former-gateway’  
metropolitan areas is largely attributed to their inability to attract immigrants. Memphis is
not included in this report. The discussion on immigrant population in each metropolitan
area further supports two of the key factors – growth and diversity – in the classification
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of  ‘Next  Frontier’  and  ‘Industrial  Cores’  metropolitan  areas.  Further,  it  illustrates  the  role  
immigration plays on overall population growth.
The Brookings Institution and Florida each caution that one shortcoming of
economic success at the metropolitan scale is higher levels of income inequality. The
comparison of these two groups provides a good opportunity to study income segregation
and the relationship of metropolitan strength. This study could potentially highlight
positive or negative effects success has on low- and high-income populations. The
consensus on the importance of economic growth led me to believe other metropolitan
areas would seek to mimic the successful metropolitan areas. For that reason, I believed it
is important to evaluate income segregation in metropolitan areas considered to be
successful. In the following section, I present the results of each segregation measure for
the eight metropolitan areas included in this study.
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Chapter Four: Results
This section presents the results of each method used to analyze the patterns of
poverty and affluence, but first it is important to illustrate the dichotomous growth the
two groups of metropolitan areas experienced in comparable time periods. First is a
discussion on population growth between 1990 and 2010, and second, the changes in
Gross Metropolitan Product in the past five years.
Following the discussion of economic and population growth, I present the results
of poverty and affluence separately, but follow the same organizational pattern within
each income group. Results of poverty are discussed first and the initial data presented
are the poverty rates for each metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. After the
introductory depiction of poverty within each metro, the remaining portion is divided into
three sections: segregation indices, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods, and spatial
statistics. Within segregation indices, I discuss the result of the dissimilarity and isolation
indices. The discussion of neighborhood poverty is divided into three groups: highpoverty, extreme-poverty, and the spatial patterns of concentrated poverty. Finally, within
spatial statistics section, the results of the four spatial statistics are presented: Global
Moran’s  I,  Getis-Ord  General  G,  Local  Moran’s  I,  and  the  Getis  Gi*.  The  discussion  on  
the segregation of affluence follows this and is organized in the same structure.
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Population Growth
Population growth is one of the factors the Brookings Institution used to classify
metropolitan  areas.  The  ‘Next  Frontier’  metropolitan  areas,  which  include  the  successful  
metropolitan areas in this study, experienced a growth in population above the national
average.  The  ‘Industrial  Cores’  metropolitan  areas  – which include those metropolitan
areas exhibiting weaker growth – are below the national average in population growth.
The population totals and growth rates for each metropolitan area are in Table 1 and
Table 2. The total population, average population, and average growth rate are included.

Table 1: Weaker Growing Metropolitan Areas Population, 1990-2010
Metro

1990

2000

growth rate
(1990-2000

2010

growth rate (20002010)

growth rate
(1990-2010)

Buffalo

1,161,659

1,138,205

-2.06%

1,107,000

-2.82%

-4.94%

Cleveland

2,068,045

2,105,448

1.78%

2,044,199

-3.00%

-1.17%

Detroit

4,197,092

4,394,866

4.50%

4,298,214

-2.25%

2.35%

Memphis

1,038,562

1,179,978

11.98%

1,273,061

7.31%

18.42%

Total pop

8,465,358

8,818,497

Average pop

2,116,340

2,204,624

-1.10%

2.95%

8,722,474
4.00%

2,180,619

Table 2: Stronger Growing Metropolitan Areas Population, 1990-2010
Metro

1990

2000

growth rate
(1990-2000

2010

growth rate (20002010)

growth rate
(1990-2010)

Austin

816,641

1,215,827

32.83%

1,592,568

23.66%

48.72%

Denver

1,641,166

2,151,410

23.72%

2,433,756

11.60%

32.57%

Seattle

2,496,830

2,984,177

16.33%

3,295,755

9.45%

24.24%

Washington DC

4,017,817

4,700,220

14.52%

5,311,742

11.51%

24.36%

Total pop

8,972,454

11,051,634

Average pop

2,243,114

2,762,909

12.52%

28.98%

12,633,821
18.81%

3,158,455

Source: 1990 Census, 2000 Census, and 2006-10 American Community Survey

In 1990, the two groups had roughly the same total number of residents, a
difference slightly more than 110,000 people. However, the stronger metropolitan areas
increased, on average, by roughly 500,000 citizens per decade as the average population
increased from 2.24 million in 1990 to 3.15 million in 2010. At the same time, the weaker
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metropolitan areas average population increased by about 80,000 people between 1990
and 2000 and then experienced a small decrease in average population between 2000 and
2010. Thus, their average population changed from about 2.12 million in 1990 to about
2.18 million in 2010.
Gross Metropolitan Product
Table 3: Weaker Growing Metropolitan Areas, Gross Metropolitan Product
2011
Buffalo

2012

2013

2014

rate of change
(2011-2014)

$45.8

$47.1

$47.2

$48.5

5.57%

Cleveland

$108.1

$111.6

$112.7

$116.1

6.89%

Detroit

$199.6

$208.4

$211.0

$218.7

8.73%

$64.3

$66.7

$68.3

$71.2

9.69%

Memphis
Average

$104.5
$108.5
$109.8
$113.6
Source: IHS Global Insight, US Metros Economies (2013)

7.72%

Table 4: Stronger Growing Metropolitan Areas, Gross Metropolitan Product
2011

2012

2013

2014

rate of change
(2011-2014)

Austin

$91.5

$98.7

$103.2

$109.3

16.29%

Denver

$161.8

$167.9

$173.3

$182.2

11.20%

Seattle

$243.8

$258.8

$268.5

$281.0

13.24%

Washington, DC

$437.2

$446.9

$455.8

$477.5

8.44%

Average

$233.6
$243.1
$250.2
$262.5
Source: IHS Global Insight, US Metros Economies (2013)

12.29%

The different paces of economic growth between the two groups are revealed in
the gross metropolitan product, as seen in Table 3 and Table 4. The growth rates are not
as divisive as the population growth rates, but the disparity of average growth rate in the
past four years is clear. Further, this illustrates the range of economic output of the
metropolitan  areas  included  in  the  study.  Washington,  DC’s  growth  rate  is  below  
Memphis  and  Detroit,  but  Washington,  DC’s  economy  is  more  than  twice  as  large  as  
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Detroit, and four times the size of Memphis. The growth rates inferred from the
methodological section are confirmed in the two previous sections.
Segregation of Poverty
Poverty Rate
Before engaging the results from the segregation measures, the poverty rate for
each metropolitan area is presented, as well as the trends experienced from 1990 to 2010
and what patterns emerge between the stronger and weaker growing metros. The poverty
rate informs the results of segregation measures, is well understood, easy to
conceptualize, and a familiar reference to contextualize broad trends. Further, it provides
a link to the relationship between poverty rate on a metropolitan-wide scale and
segregation. The results are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Poverty Rates, 1990-2010
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As illustrated in Figure 1, Memphis had the highest poverty rate in 1990 at 19.2%.
The four weaker cities had four of the five highest poverty rates of the group. Austin,
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which had the second highest poverty rate at 15.9%, was the only stronger metro to have
a poverty rate in the top five. In 1990, the average poverty rate of the weaker cities was
14%, while the stronger cities average 10.1%.
At the turn of the century, most of the eight metropolitan areas followed the
national trend and experienced a decline in poverty (Jargowsky 2003). The poverty rate
in all four of the weaker metro areas declined, although Buffalo only dropped 0.1%. As
for  the  stronger  metropolitan  areas,  Austin  and  Denver’s  poverty  rates  decreased,  
Seattle’s  plateaued  and  Washington,  D.C. increased – but maintained its status as the
metropolitan area with the lowest poverty rate – from 6.5% to 7.4%. As in 1990, Austin
was the only stronger metropolitan area to have a higher poverty rate than any of the
weaker cities. Austin had the third highest poverty rate, 11.1%. Again, Denver, Seattle
and Washington, DC had the three lowest poverty rates of the eight metropolitan areas.
The average poverty rate of the weaker metropolitan areas dropped to 12.2% and the
stronger group declined to 8.7%.
Between 2000 and 2010, all metropolitan areas aside from Washington, DC
experienced an increase in their poverty rate. Memphis, 18.6%, and Washington, DC,
7.3%, remained on each end of the spectrum for the third straight decade. Again, Austin
was the only metropolitan area within its group to attain one of the four highest poverty
rates, although this time it ranked third and maintained its edge over Buffalo and
Cleveland by a mere 0.1%. The weaker metropolitan areas average poverty rate in 2010
increased to 15.1% and the stronger metros to 10.8% – averages that exceed values either
group experienced in 1990 or 2000.
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All of the metropolitan areas, except for Austin and Memphis experienced an
increase in poverty rate over the 20-year period. Austin and Memphis had the highest
poverty rates for each group all three decades but their poverty rates dropped from 19.2 to
18.6%, and from 15.9 to 13.9%, respectively. Perhaps the most noteworthy change was
the increases of the perennial bottom three – Washington DC, Seattle, and Denver –
which saw their collective average increase from 8.2% to 9.8% between 1990 and 2010, a
trend otherwise  muted  by  Austin’s  2%  decline.
Dissimilarity Index
The dissimilarity index is a measure of evenness. When used to measure the
segregation of poverty, it indicates how many low-income people need to move out of the
neighborhood for it to reflect the  metropolitan  area’s  composition  of  poor  to  non-poor
residents.  Thus,  the  metropolitan  area’s  poverty  rate  does  inform the interpretation of the
dissimilarity values. For example, if a metropolitan area has a poverty rate of 15% and a
non-poor population of 85%, then a neighborhood must have the same composition for it
to  be  considered  ‘even’  (Massey  and  Denton  1993).  A dissimilarity value of .15 indicates
the  metro  area  is  ‘even.’  For  context,  in all three decades, none of the eight cities had
poverty rates higher than 20% or lower than 6%. Based on my review of the literature, it
seems this key point is frequently lost in the discussion – my assumption is because
residential segregation scholars frequently engage a macro-scale view, studying multiple
metropolitan areas with one test and trust imbalances are corrected through sample size.
The Dissimilarity Index results are in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Dissimilarity Index, Poverty
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Data from 1990 reveal a clear split between the stronger and weaker metropolitan
areas. The weaker metropolitan areas all have a dissimilarity score of greater than .42
while all metros in the stronger group have scores below .40. Detroit has the highest
score at .51, with Cleveland closely behind at .50. Aside from Seattle at .31, the disparity
between the two groups is not especially great; all other metros were greater than .38.
Cleveland and Detroit have the highest dissimilarity scores in 2000, each with .46.
Seattle continues to have the lowest dissimilarity score at .30, but otherwise, the
remaining five metros fall between .37 and .44. The stronger metros have the three lowest
dissimilarity scores and the weaker metros have the three highest scores. Memphis (.40)
and Austin (.41) split from their respective groups. From 1990 to 2000, the dissimilarity
index for all metropolitan areas, except Austin, decreased. This is potentially related to
the overall decline of poverty in the majority of these eight metropolitan areas.
In 2010, Cleveland and Detroit, despite both experiencing decreases, again had
the highest dissimilarity index scores at .44 and .43, respectively. For the third
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consecutive decade, Seattle had the lowest dissimilarity index score, .33. The gap
between the strong and weak metros decreased in 2010, however, the weaker metros
continued to have higher scores. Denver had the highest dissimilarity index score of the
stronger metros, .41, tying Memphis, which had the lowest for the weaker metro areas.
Between 2000 and 2010, the weaker metropolitan areas, save Memphis, saw their scores
decrease as the stronger metro areas, aside from Austin, experienced an increase.
Over the two-decade period, all four strong metropolitan areas – Austin, Denver,
Seattle and Washington, DC – experienced an increase in their dissimilarity scores. In
that time, the weaker growing metropolitan areas – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and
Memphis – experienced a decrease. To compare the magnitude of the changes, the
increase experienced in the stronger metropolitan areas was minimal – likely due to the
decrease between 1990 and 2000. However, the weaker metropolitan areas demonstrated
a steady decline in their dissimilarity scores over the 20-year  period.  While  Memphis’  
decline was subdued, it is worth noting its relatively low dissimilarity score given the
high poverty rate.
Ultimately, between 1990 and 2010, the weaker metropolitan areas have higher
degrees of unevenness. However, the unevenness declined in the weaker metro areas. On
the other hand, unevenness increased as the populations and economies of stronger
metropolitan areas grew.
Exposure Indices
The lack of exposure to different income groups can compromise the quality of
everyday life, economic opportunity and social relations (Ross et al. 2004). The isolation
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and interaction indices each measures exposure (Massey and Denton 1988). For the
following discussion I present the isolation index values because it is more intuitive to
use the index where a higher value relates to higher segregation. The values are listed in
Figure 3. As discussed in the methods section, the isolation index measures the likelihood
a member of minority group (in this instance, low-income) lives in a neighborhood with
another individual in poverty (Spivek et al. 2012). A value of 1 indicates all low-income
people live in neighborhoods of only low-income people
Figure 3: Isolation Index, Poverty
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In 1990, Memphis had the highest isolation value at .34 and Washington, DC had
the lowest at .14. All of the weaker metropolitan areas had isolation values greater than
.24 while the four stronger metros had values below .26. The weaker metros had the
highest three values and the stronger metros had the three lowest values but low-income
population in Austin (.26) are more isolated than in Buffalo (.25). Overall, the weak four
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metropolitan areas had an average isolation value of .29 and the stronger metros are
significantly lower at .19.
Cleveland and Buffalo had the highest values of isolation, 24, in 2000. Seattle had
the lowest levels of isolation at .14. Isolation values declined for all metropolitan areas,
except Washington, DC, during the 1990s. Although Washington, DC increased during
this time span, its value remained quite low at .15. The most significant change in this
period  was  Memphis’  decline from .34 to .16. The division between strong and weak
metros diminished during the 1990s; by 2000, the weaker metropolitan areas average
isolation value decreased to .21 and the stronger metros dropped to .17. As in 1990,
Austin stands out among the stronger metropolitan areas with an isolation value of .21;
otherwise, the remaining strong metropolitan areas have values below .16. Memphis is
the outlier among the weaker metropolitan areas at .16 while the other weaker metro
areas are all greater than .22.
Both groups of metropolitan areas experienced an increase in average isolation
values. The weaker metropolitan areas increased to .28, just shy of its score in 1990, and
the stronger metros escalated to .20, eclipsing its previous peak in 1990. In 2010, just as
in 1990, Memphis and Washington, DC re-emerged as the metropolitan areas with the
highest and lowest isolation values. Once again, Austin had the highest isolation value of
the stronger metropolitan areas at .26, the same as Buffalo, the lowest value of any weak
metropolitan area. In the 2000s, the isolation values of all eight metropolitan areas
increased. Further, over the 20-year period, each of the strong metropolitan areas
experienced a stable or increasing isolation value. Denver, Seattle and Washington, DC
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each experienced an increase during this time span and Austin, which consistently had
the highest isolation value of its metropolitan peers, had the same value in 2010 as in
1990, .26. On the other hand, isolation values of the weaker metropolitan areas stabilized
or decreased. Memphis, Detroit and Cleveland each experienced a decline in isolation
while Buffalo, which was consistently the lowest of its group, maintained the same value
over the two-decade span.
The isolation index responds to changes in the poverty rate. The decline in
poverty rates in the 1990s accompanied decreasing isolation values. Likewise, there was
in increase in poverty rate and isolation in the 2000s. Between 1990 and 2010, the weaker
metros slightly declined while the stronger metropolitan areas increased, however, lowincome populations in weaker metropolitan areas consistently experienced higher levels
of isolation from non-low-income groups.
Spatial Segregation Indices
While the dissimilarity index and isolation index are aspatial, three of the
segregation dimensions are spatial: concentration, clustering and centralization. Results
from the Absolute Concentration Index (ACO) are presented in Figure 4.The ACO ranges
from 0 to 1 and the higher value corresponds with higher segregation.
All of the metropolitan areas exhibit high levels on concentration in 1990. Five
metros – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, and Washington, DC – share the highest
value, .91. Memphis has the lowest value, likely due to the high number of poverty in
large census tracts far from the urban center. There is little separation between the strong
and weak metros, as all but Austin and Memphis have values between .89 and .91.
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Figure 4: Absolute Concentration Index, Poverty
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In 2000, the difference between the metropolitan areas diminishes as Austin and
Memphis each experience an increase in their ACO values. Denver increases to .93 and is
the highest. Despite increasing from .69 to .79, Memphis continues to have the lowest
value. All eight metropolitan areas experienced an increase in the 1990s. The strong
metro areas have an average of .91 and the weaker metros have an average ACO of .89.
Denver (.93) and Memphis (.80) remain on either end of the spectrum in 2010.
Although some metropolitan areas demonstrate a moderate decline, values still remain
high in 2010, and on average, both groups experienced an increase during the twentyyear period. The strong metropolitan areas averaged .90 and the weaker metros averaged
.87 in 2010.
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The Absolute Clustering Index (ACI) measures the degree to which poverty
neighborhoods adjoin one another. The ACI ranges from 0 to 1; the closer a value is to 1
indicates higher segregation. The results are presented in Figure 5.
In 1990, Detroit had the highest degree of clustering and Seattle had the lowest.
There is a clear division between the two groups in 1990, as the strong metropolitan areas
had the four lowest values, all below .13, and the weak metropolitan areas all had above
.13. The strong metro areas averaged .09 and the weaker metropolitan areas averaged .15.
Figure 5: Absolute Clustering Index, Poverty
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All eight metropolitan areas exhibited a decline in the clustering of poverty during
the 1990s, likely due to the decline in overall poverty rates experienced during that same
time. Detroit and Washington, DC continued to have the highest and lowest degrees of
clustering, respectively; however, the gap between the two groups lessened. In 2000, the
strong metropolitan areas averaged .07 and the weaker metropolitan areas dropped to .1.
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Finally, in 2010, the differenced continued to decline. Washington, DC and
Denver increased, minimizing the separation between strong and weak metropolitan
areas. Detroit continued to have the highest value, but the weak metropolitan areas
average declined to .09 and the strong metropolitan areas plateaued at .07.
The final spatial segregation index is the Absolute Centralization Index (ACI),
which measures the proximity of individuals in poverty to the central city. The ACI
ranges from -1 to 1; a positive value indicates a high degree of centralization, a negative
value indicates individuals in poverty are far from the central city, and a 0 indicates there
is even dispersion throughout the metropolitan area. The one shortcoming of this
approach is the various size and shape of jurisdictional boundaries.
The strong metropolitan areas and weak metropolitan areas both averaged .75 in
1990. Denver had the highest value at .92, and Austin had the lowest, .61. The other six
metropolitan areas ACI values range from .71 to .81.
There was not a great degree of change between 1990 and 2000 in the
centralization values. Detroit and Washington, DC each experienced a moderate decline,
and Austin exhibited the greatest change, an increase of .07, however, the averages of the
two groups did not adjust significantly. The strong metropolitan areas average increased
from .75 to .77 and the weak metro areas remained at .75 in 2000.
Lastly, in 2010, most of the metropolitan areas experienced a decline in the ACI
values. Denver remained the highest, remaining at .92 for the third consecutive decade,
and Cleveland had the lowest value at .65. The strong and weak metropolitan areas
experienced a decline in their average as a group. The strong metros decline to their 1990
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average  of  .75  while  the  weaker  metros  dropped  to  .72.  Denver’s  consistently  high  values  
may be the result of a particularly odd shaped central city in comparison to the other
metro areas included in this study.
Figure 6: Absolute Centralization Index, Poverty
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High- and Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods
In this section, I discuss the findings of high-poverty and extreme-poverty
neighborhoods independent of one another and then offer a holistic interpretation of the
two groups. Following this is a discussion of the spatial pattern of concentrated-poverty
neighborhoods. I mapped the concentration of poverty at two different thresholds, 2039% (high-poverty) and greater than 40% (extreme poverty). The results are presented as
percentages of census tracts within each threshold because of the wide disparity between
total census tracts in each metro. For example, Washington, DC and Detroit each have
over 1200 census tracts while Austin, Memphis and Buffalo have less than 350. To
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illustrate, Washington, DC has 22 extreme-poverty neighborhoods and Memphis has 29
in 2000; although similar total numbers of extreme poverty tracts, that is 9.3% of census
tracts in Memphis and only 1.6% in Washington, DC.
Extreme-poverty neighborhoods
Figure 7: Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts
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In extreme-poverty neighborhoods, there is a clear division between the strong
and weak metropolitan areas for each decade. In 1990, Memphis had the highest, 14.4%,
of extreme-poverty census tracts. The metropolitan area with the lowest percentage of
extreme-poverty tracts was Washington, DC, with only 0.8%. The weak four
metropolitan areas had the four highest percentages of extreme-poverty tracts, all with
greater than 5.7%. The strong four metropolitan areas all had less than 4.6% of their
census tracts classified as extreme-poverty.
Despite more than a 5% decrease, Memphis had the highest percentage of
extreme-poverty tracts again in 2000. Denver replaced Washington, DC as the metro with
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the lowest percentage at 0.5%. Detroit also experienced a noticeable decline of over 5%.
The division between strong and weak narrowed, but remained, as the weaker four
metros all had greater than 3.5% of their census tracts classified as extreme-poverty. The
strong metros all had less than 2.9%. Between 1990 and 2000, seven of the eight
metropolitan areas experienced a decrease in the percentage of extreme-poverty
neighborhoods; only Washington, DC experienced an increase – from 0.8 to 1.6%.
For the third consecutive decade, Memphis had the highest percentage of
extreme-poverty census tracts, and the percentage skyrocketed to 15.1% - the highest for
any metropolitan area in any decade. Washington, DC again had the lowest percentage
with 1.5% extreme-poverty tracts. The separation between the two groups reached its
greatest divide as the weak four metro areas all had higher than 8.8% and the stronger
metros had less than 5.4% of their neighborhoods classified as extreme poverty tracts.
Between 2000 and 2010, seven of the metropolitan areas, excluding Washington,
DC increased the percentage of extreme poverty tracts. Both groups witnessed a
significant jump in their percentages during the 2000s, particularly the weaker metros.
The average percentage of extreme-poverty neighborhoods increased from 5.8 to 11.1%.
During the same time, the stronger metros increased from 1.5 to 2.6%. Between 1990 and
2010, seven of the metros areas experienced an increase. Only Seattle (no change) did not
increase the percentage of extreme-poverty neighborhoods during the two-decade span.
The numbers in 1990 closely resemble those in 2010. Over the time study period, weaker
metros, on average, increased from 9.5% to 11.1% while the stronger metros increased
from 2.2 to 2.6%. The decline in extreme-poverty neighborhoods during the 1990s, which
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matches nationwide trends, appears to only be a short-term decline in the metropolitan
areas examined here.
High-Poverty Neighborhoods
Figure 8: High-Poverty Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts
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As shown in Figure 5, Austin’s  rate  of  high-poverty tracts, 22.0, certainly bucks
the trend between the two groups observed in extreme-poverty neighborhoods but
following Austin are the four weaker metros, all had percentages higher than 11.4%.
Washington, DC, 4.8, had the lowest percentage. Aside from Austin, the remaining three
strong metros had less than 8.5% of their neighborhoods classified as high-poverty.
In 2000, Memphis replaced Austin with the highest percentage of high-poverty
tracts, 22.8%, and Seattle displaced Washington DC as the lowest with 5.7%. By 2000,
the four weaker metros had the four highest percentages of high-poverty neighborhoods;
all greater than 16.6%. The strong metros each had percentages less than 13.4%. During
70

the 1990s, high-poverty neighborhoods increased in all four weak metro areas, likely
related to the decline of extreme-poverty neighborhoods observed during the same time
period in all four metros. Only DC experienced an increase in both high- and extremepoverty neighborhoods in 1990s. Austin had a significant decline to 13.4%, Seattle
decreased from 6.1 to 5.4%, and Denver dropped from 8.5 to 7.4%.
Again in 2010, Memphis had the highest percentage of high-poverty
neighborhoods, 28.5% - the highest percentage for any metro in any decade. Washington,
DC, although increasing to 6.2%, had the lowest percentage of any metropolitan area.
The division between the strong and weaker metros is blurred in 2010. Cleveland is the
second highest at 22.4% and despite doubling the number of high-poverty tracts during
the time period, Seattle remains the second lowest at 11.4%, but there is a a cluster
around 19-20% for the remaining four cities. Overall, all eight metropolitan areas
increased between 2000 and 2010. Further, aside from Austin, the remaining seven
metropolitan areas increased between 1990 and 2010.
On average, the percentages of high-poverty tracts increased for each group
between 1990 and 2010. The trends are not equal when comparing the two decades; the
percentage of high-poverty neighborhoods in weaker metro areas increased roughly 3%
each decade, however, the stronger metros experienced a much different pattern. After a
2.5% decline in the 1990s, the stronger metro areas increased 6% between 2000 and
2010.
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High- and Extreme-Poverty Neighborhoods
Overall, there is a clear difference between the strong and weak metropolitan
areas in extreme-poverty neighborhoods. The four weak metros have the highest
percentage in all three decades. In sum, there is a much higher likelihood for a person to
live in an extreme poverty neighborhood if that person lives in Buffalo, Cleveland,
Detroit or Memphis. Neither the strong nor weak metros were immune to the growth of
concentrated poverty during the 2000s after the brief period of relief in the 1990s.
The high-poverty neighborhoods do not present such a clear division between the
two groups, particularly in 2010. There is some separation in 1990 and 2000, if not for
Austin’s  incredibly  high  number  of  high-poverty tracts in 1990.
After examining the percentage of extreme- and high-poverty neighborhoods in
each decade, it is crucial to understand how these trends manifest spatially, and how
location changes over time. In the following section, I discuss the location of extremeand high-poverty tracts in each metropolitan area between 1990 and 2010.
Spatial Patterns of Concentrated Poverty
Within this section, I explain the spatial patterns of concentrated poverty in each
metropolitan area separately. The weak metropolitan areas are described first followed by
the strong metropolitan areas; each group is organized alphabetically. Additionally, highand extreme-poverty neighborhoods are discussed together. If noticeable geographic
patterns exist for one group in particular, that will be noted, but otherwise I will simply
refer to the neighborhoods as concentrated poverty neighborhoods. The patterns from
1990 to 2010 are discussed within each metro area. All maps are in Appendix A.
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Buffalo
High- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods grew each decade in Buffalo. In 1990,
extreme-poverty neighborhoods were located in central Buffalo, north of Interstate-190
and West of Interstate-90, and extend northeast. High-poverty neighborhoods surround
downtown Buffalo. There are also high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods near
Niagara Falls in the northern metro area. There was little change in the location of
neighborhoods in the 1990s aside from some slight dispersal from central Buffalo and
growth near Lockport. Finally, in 2010, the high-poverty neighborhoods expand around
Lockport and Niagara Falls. Downtown Buffalo also absorbed some of the growth in
concentrated poverty, primarily near the northern boundary of the city.
Cleveland
In 1990, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods are throughout downtown and
central city neighborhoods, extending both east and west as the eastern boundary of highpoverty neighborhoods extended as far east as East 152nd Street. There are also isolated
groups in the western part of the metro near Lorain and Elyria.
Those isolated groups remain on the periphery in 2000 and experience very little
change. The concentration near downtown Cleveland remains and the concentration of
extreme-poverty neighborhoods shift to the south. High poverty tracts continue to move
east and a new area emerges south of Cleveland around North Randall. In 2010, the
concentration spreads from downtown – both high and extreme neighborhoods – into
central city neighborhoods in all directions. Extreme-poverty neighborhoods growth is
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noticeable to the west near the Lakewood and Cleveland boundary and to the east in East
Cleveland. Finally, there is a growth near North Randall and Bedford Heights.
Detroit
There is a concentration of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods throughout
Detroit in 1990. There is a clear boundary of this concentration along 8 Mile Road to the
north and Highway 24 to the west. Pontiac, to the northwest of Detroit, has a
concentration of poverty neighborhoods as does an area to the west around the
intersection of Interstate-94 and Interestate-275.
The northern and western boundaries of concentrated poverty neighborhoods
remain in downtown Detroit but a significant number of extreme-poverty tracts are
reduced to high-poverty in 2000. The clustering west of the city and in Pontiac decline
slightly. In 2010, a large number of extreme-poverty census tracts re-emerge in central
Detroit. The number of high-poverty tracts moves west and north from the central city.
The area west of the city appears again and expands beyond its 1990 coverage.
Additionally, there is a growth of high-poverty neighborhoods in the northeastern part of
the metro, roughly 40 miles from downtown Detroit.
Memphis
Over  32%  of  Memphis’  census  tracts are high- or extreme-poverty in 1990,
therefore it is little surprise to find concentrated poverty neighborhoods located
throughout the Memphis metropolitan area. The western periphery has multiple extremepoverty neighborhoods while the tracts found on the eastern periphery are high-poverty
neighborhoods. This east-west divide remains true near downtown Memphis as a the
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portion of the city west of Interstate-240 is covered with extreme-poverty tracks and the
neighborhoods east of the thoroughfare are predominantly high-poverty. The division
along I-240 becomes even clearer in 2000. High-poverty tracts move south to the
Tennessee border and north of I-40. The neighborhoods on the eastern periphery diminish
and those on the western boundary reduce to high-poverty.
Memphis’  high- and extreme-poverty neighborhood eclipse 40% in 2010 and the
boundaries of the metropolitan area absorb some of this growth, but to a lesser extent
than in 1990. Near downtown extreme-poverty neighborhoods increase and high-poverty
neighborhoods emerge. The extreme-poverty tracts appear east of I-240 along I-40 and
both north and south of the city. The most noticeable change is the growth of high- and
extreme- poverty tracts beyond the outer belt.
Austin
In 1990, high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods are located throughout the
central city. The majority of extreme-poverty census tracts are east of Interstate-35.
Beyond the near urban area, high and extreme poverty neighborhoods are located in the
southern portion of the metro area near San Marcos and in southeastern Austin MSA near
Red Rock. Also, Paige to the east and Granger to the northeast are both home to highpoverty neighborhoods in 1990.
Austin’s  high- and extreme-neighborhoods decreased significantly by 2000 and
noticeable change in the spatial patterns accompanied the decline. The reduction of
extreme-poverty neighborhoods in near urban areas, particularly east of downtown was
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the most significant. The outer suburban areas almost disappear aside from the area near
San Marcos in the south and in Taylor to the northeast.
During the 2000s Austin experienced a growth in high- and extreme-poverty
neighborhoods. High-poverty neighborhoods emerge south of Highway 290 and to the
southeast along the urban fringe near the Austin-Bergstrom International Airport. Within
the city, high-poverty neighborhoods run in a linear pattern from the southern to northern
boundary of Austin, and extreme poverty neighborhoods emerge in the northeast area,
near the University of Texas – no surprise with the concentration of students. In the
suburban areas, poverty neighborhoods remain and expand around San Marcos and
Taylor.
Denver
Extreme-poverty neighborhoods are located along Interstate-25 from north of
Louisiana Avenue to Interstate-70 in 1990. Many high-poverty neighborhoods are located
west of I-25 along 6th Avenue, northwest of downtown; and to the north and south of I70, east of I-25. High-poverty neighborhoods are also located along Colfax Avenue, east
of Quebec to I-225. Further, Glendale and the area west of Santa Fe have high poverty
neighborhoods.
Denver experienced a drop in high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods between
1990 and 2000, but the spatial location did not change a great deal. Overall, there was a
reduction in extreme-poverty tracts but minor changes in location aside from extremepoverty neighborhoods concentrating around I-25 and 6th Avenue.
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The number of high- and extreme-poverty tracts jumped from 49 to 140 between
2000 and 2010 in Denver. This increase in number of tracts resulted in a drastic change in
geography of poverty. The extreme-poverty neighborhoods continued around 6th Avenue
and I-25 and transitioned from high-poverty neighborhoods along East Colfax and
Alameda, west of I-225. High poverty areas expanded from this region to the north of I70 and south towards Aurora. Aurora experienced enormous growth in concentrated
poverty neighborhoods to the west of I-225.
Seattle
The extreme-poverty neighborhoods in 1990 are located predominantly in
downtown Seattle and around the University of Washington. High-poverty
neighborhoods extend south from downtown along Interstate-5. Tacoma, Washington –
in the southern part of the Seattle MSA – also has multiple high- and extreme-poverty
neighborhoods. Finally, Everett has a small presence of high-poverty neighborhoods.
Seattle experienced a reduction in concentrated poverty neighborhoods between
1990 and 2000. High-poverty neighborhoods replaced extreme-poverty neighborhoods
near downtown Seattle. Concentrated poverty neighborhoods remained around Everett, in
the northern part of the metro. The concentration around Tacoma migrated slightly north
and east.
Between 2000 and 2010, the number of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods
nearly doubled, from 48 to 94. The growth largely occurred in Tacoma, south of
downtown Seattle, and near Everett. The growth around Tacoma and Everett were largely
expansions of previous locations of high-poverty areas, however, the area south of
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downtown Seattle emerged in 2010, just as downtown experienced a decline. The growth
occurred at the previous southern boundary of where poverty extended from downtown
but now extends further south than in 1990.
Washington, DC
In 1990, high- and extreme-neighborhoods are located predominantly on the east
side of Washington, DC. Additionally, there are areas to the northeast around College
Park, Maryland. Washington, DC had about 20 more high or extreme-poverty tracts in
2000, and this growth continued to move north and east. The area around College Park,
MD expands and directly east of the District in Glenarden, MD grows, as well.
Washington, DC experienced only a small growth in high- or extreme-poverty
neighborhoods between 2000 and 2010, but the location dispersed slightly from
downtown Washington, DC and continued to move north of Interstate-695, south of
Florida Avenue NW, and east. High-and extreme-poverty neighborhoods continue to
expand around College Park, MD and high-poverty neighborhoods emerge beyond the
DC boundary along 495, the beltway, in various directions.
Spatial Statistics
Global Moran’s  I
Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure  of  spatial  autocorrelation  – it evaluates the
clustering of both high and low values. Global  Moran’s  I  is  an  inferential  statistic  and  can  
be evaluated based on the z-score. The null hypothesis of the Global  Moran’s  I  is  that  the
spatial distribution is random. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates we can not
reject the null hypothesis, and spatial patterns of the dataset are a random process. A
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statistically significant z-score indicates either clustering or dispersal beyond random
processes. If the z-score is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis. The
direction (positive or negative) of the z-score  and  the  Moran’s  Index  will  correspond.  If
the z-score is a statistically significant positive value, and the Moran’s  Index  is  positive,
we reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than
can be expected from a true random process. If the z-score is a statistically significant
negative value, and the Moran’s  Index is negative, we can also reject the null hypothesis,
however in this case because the high and low values are more dispersed than would be
expected from a random selection. The z-score  and  Moran’s  Index  should  be  evaluated  
only in relation to another decade of the same metropolitan area, and not in comparison to
other metros due to the variation in number of census tracts and spatial units.
Table  5:  Global  Moran’s  I,  Individuals  in  Poverty
Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis
Denver
Seattle
Washington, DC
Austin

1990

2000

2010

0.912

0.862

0.559

29.15**

27.5**

17.89**

1.005

0.8552

0.396

54.73**

46.59**

21.64**

1.018

0.9262

0.632

72.88**

66.33**

45.43**

0.6639

0.397

0.22995

16.2297**

9.7**

5.658**

0.827

0.72

0.586

37.55**

32.69**

26.56**

0.612

0.467

0.3

25.62**

19.43**

12.54**

1.071

0.88

0.486

82.598**

67.8**

37.43**

0.647

0.738

0.509

16.89**

19.31**

13.37**

** indicates statistically significant at 99%
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Table  5  includes  the  Moran’s  Index  and  z-score for each metropolitan area in
1990,  2000,  and  2010.  The  italicized  number  below  the  Moran’s  Index  is  the  z-score,
which indicates statistical significance. When measuring the number of individuals in
poverty in each census tract for 1990, 2000 and 2010, we are able to reject the null
hypothesis in all eight metropolitan areas because of statistically significant, positive zscores, which indicates poverty is spatially autocorrelated.
Getis-Ord General G
The Getis-Ord General G measures if high or low values cluster. The General G
interprets values in relation to the expected value. The null hypothesis of the General G is
no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a statistically significant z-score we are able
to reject the null hypothesis. A statistically significant positive z-score indicates high
values are more clustered than can be expected from a truly random sample. Statistically
significant negative z-scores indicate the low-values are spatially clustered more than can
be expected from a truly random sample. The observed General G ranges from 0-1; the
closer to 1 indicates high values are clustered, and closer to 0 indicates low values are
clustered, however, the z-score must be significant in order to reject the null hypothesis.
In Table 6, the z-score is the italicized value below Observed General G for each
metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. Testing the number of individuals in number
of poverty with the Getis-Ord General G, we are able to reject the null hypothesis in each
metropolitan area because of statistically significant, positive z-scores.
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Table 6: Getis-Ord General G, Individuals in Poverty
Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis
Denver
Seattle
Washington, DC
Austin

1990
0.074

2000
0.0628

2010
0.0484

18.78**

17.891**

13.303**

0.0475

0.039

0.026

29.563**

25.753**

14.14**

0.0232

0.018

0.0129

47.745**

41.42**

28.18**

.0288

0.0207

0.016

10.559**

7.006**

3.887**

0.032

0.027

0.022

27.05**

23.44**

18.94**

0.014

0.01196

0.01

17.289**

14.365**

10.11**

0.025

0.0196

0.0142

41.84**

34.33**

21.12**

0.029

0.0325

0.023

12.92**

14.77**

9.82**

** indicates statistically significant at 99%

Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I
Anselin’s Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected
distribution.
Buffalo
Downtown Buffalo has a clustering of High/High tracts with four Low/High tracts
interspersed throughout the area. The High/High clusters cover the area from the Niagara
River to Ogden Street and south of Interstate-90. There are similar clusters observed in
2000 as in 1990, but the High/High tracts do move slightly to the north. A Low/Low tract
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emerges to the southeast of Buffalo. In 2010, the High/High clusters continue to move
north near I-90 and High/High groups are pushed slightly east and west where a minor
division emerges in north central Buffalo. As is true with previous decades, a small
number of Low/High tracts are intermixed within the urban area.
Cleveland
High/High clusters are throughout downtown and into eastern neighborhoods of
the central city, extending to the western boundary of Shaker Heights, an eastern suburb.
There are also High/High tracts near Lorain in the western part of the metropolitan area.
Lastly, the southwest portion of the metropolitan area has multiple Low/Low tracts. In
2000,  there  isn’t  much  change  in  the  clusters  of  High/High tracts downtown or in Lorain.
Also, the Low/Low tracts continue in Beachwood and expand north on the west side
towards Avon.
Lastly, in 2010, High/High clusters remain in Lorain and emerge in the far eastern
part near Painesville and Grand River. Downtown, the High/High tracts split down the
center and move west, southeast and northeast. Low/Low tracts retreat to the
southwestern corner of the metro in a similar pattern as 1990.
Detroit
There is a considerable concentration of High/High tracts in the Detroit urban
area, primarily south of 8-Mile Road and east of Highway 24 and Dearborn. There are
some scattered Low/High tracts in downtown – however, these are primarily low
population tracts with less than 200 people. Further there is an isolated High/High tract
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west of the city and multiple in the Pontiac region. Finally, Low/Low neighborhoods are
found throughout the western and northern metro area.
The concentration of High/High neighborhoods in central Detroit continue but
there is a slight reduction in the number of tracts classified as High/High, particularly in
the northwest part of Detroit near the intersection of 8 Mile and Highway 24. The isolated
group of High/High tracts west of the city remains and the cluster near Pontiac slightly
expands. The number of Low/Low tracts increases in the north and western part of the
metro area. These areas could potentially have a strong link to Ann Arbor, Michigan –
just outside the Detroit metro area.
In 2010, the High/High clusters in downtown deconcentrated slightly and move
toward the north and the west. Further, the High/High tracks near Pontiac and the area
west of the city continue to expand from their coverage in 2000.
Memphis
High/High tracts cover much of downtown and predominantly are located in the
western part of downtown Memphis and extend north and south. The western most
boundary of the metropolitan area is also home to High/High clusters. East of Memphis
there is clusters of Low/Low tracts near Collierville, Macon and Brunswick. There is also
a High/Low tract near Mt. Pleasant. In 2000, the Low/Low to the east expands north
towards Brighton and south towards West Olive Branch and the High/Low near Mt.
Pleasant remains. The High/High clusters near downtown remain in similar locations
with some growth to the south.
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Lastly, the High/High clusters in 2010 are similar to the pattern in 2000 but there
is a slight reduction in downtown as High/High clusters expand to the southwest and
north. The Low/Low tracts remain east of the city and Low/High tracts emerge northwest
of Memphis in Arkansas.
Austin
Clusters of High/High neighborhoods are noticeable in the southern and eastern
part  of  Austin’s  metropolitan  area,  near  San  Marcos  and  Cedar  Creek,  respectively.  
High/High clusters are also near downtown Austin, primarily north of Highway 290,
extending north along Interstate along and to the east of Interstate-35. There are two
neighborhoods of Low/High near the University of Texas and surrounded by High/High
neighborhoods. There are also Low/High tracts around Lamar Boulevard, north of E 38th
and south of East 51st. There are Low/Low clusters north of the city around Florence,
Lake Georgetown and Hutto; as well as to the northwest near Jonestown, Pointe Venture,
Laga Vista and Volente. High/Low clusters are along the western and northern fringe of
the metro area.
The clusters of High/High tracts in the central city move east and south. No
clusters remain in the northeastern portion of Austin, near Chestnut and Martin Luther
King. Clusters of High/High also continue in San Marcos area. Low/Low neighborhoods
are again located north of the city near Liberty Hill, Georgetown municipal Airport and
Hutto.
In 2010, High/High neighborhoods move north of 290 and east of Highway 130.
Growth continues to the south of the city. Clustering continues to disappear near the area
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around Martin Luther King, Manor Road and Springdale Road that began to experience
no clustering in 2000. High/High neighborhoods continue and grow in the southern and
easternmost regions of the metropolitan area. Additionally, the Low/Low neighborhoods
perpetuate around Liberty Hill, Georgetown and Hutto.
Denver
From 1990 to 2010, Low/Low clusters are throughout the southern metro area. In
1990, High/High clusters are located throughout Denver, particularly west of Santa Fe;
west of I-25 along 6th Avenue; along Interstate-70 east of Interstate-25; and East Colfax.
In 2000, there is little change in the High/High clusters, but there is some growth on the
east side, to the north of Interstate-70 near the I-225/I-70 intersection. Three Low/High
tracts emerge west of Sheridan Avenue, east of I-25 and West of Broadway, south of
Colfax. Finally, in 2010, High/High clusters disperse a bit from city center. There is
significant growth in Aurora, along the I-225 corridor, as well as growth to the north near
Westminster.
Seattle
Many neighborhoods of High/High clusters are found in the Seattle metro area in
1990. High/High clusters are throughout downtown Seattle and extend south along and to
the west of Interstate-5. Clusters of High/High tracts are also prevalent in Tacoma.
Everett, Washington – in the northern metro area – has a mix of High/High and
Low/High tracts. Finally, the eastern part of the metro is home to multiple Low/Low
tracts from directly east of Seattle and extending north.
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In 2000, High/High tracts continue near downtown Seattle; clusters reduce to the
area west of Interstate-5, south of Seattle. Near Tacoma, the High/High clusters move
east and Low/High tracts emerge to the west and northeast of Tacoma. Everett continues
to be an even mix and the concentration of Low/Low neighborhoods remains but moves
slightly east.
In 2010 the north and eastern area of the metro experience few changes. The
concentration of High/High tracts diminishes around downtown and High/High clusters
emerge south of downtown Seattle, as well Low/High tracts interspersed in this area. The
area around the University of Washington has a mix of High/High and Low/High
neighborhoods.
Washington, DC
In 1990, High/High clusters dominate eastern half of Washington, DC as well as
College Park, MD and Glenarden, MD. Additionally, there are Low/High clusters
northwest of downtown along Massachusetts Avenue, near Georgetown University (I
think). Patterns are similar in 2000 as in 1990, but High/High clusters expand east.
Further, High/High clusters emerge outside of DC south of Arlington and west of
Alexandria. The areas extending southeast of the US Capital along Pennsylvania Avenue
that were not significant in 1990 emerge as Low/High cluster in 2000. Lastly, in 2010
there is a growth of High/High clusters to the northeast, outside of Washington, DC
towards Silver Spring, MD – along the northeast border south of College Park, MD. By
2010, there is a complete absence of High/High tracts in the western half of Washington,
DC and scattered Low/High tracts invade the eastern and northern parts of DC.
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Getis Gi*
Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots,
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. To be clear, cold-spots due
not signal affluent areas, cold-spots only indicate clustering of tracts with low-numbers
of individuals in poverty.
Buffalo
There is little change in the location of hot-spots in Buffalo from 1990 to 2000. In
1990, hot-spots are located throughout downtown Buffalo. In 2000, those hot-spots have
extended slightly north and in addition, a hot-spot emerges near Niagara Falls in the
northern part of the Buffalo MSA. In 2010 the hot-spots near Buffalo move both north
and south along the Niagara River while the tracts in north central Buffalo disappear.
Further, isolated cold-spots emerge to the east of Buffalo.
Cleveland
In 1990, hot-spots are found in Lorain and encompasses the majority of
downtown – extending west, northeast and southeast. Cold-spots surround the western
boundary near Rocky River and Brook Park; in the southwest near Parma Heights and in
the east around Beachwood, South University Heights and Cleveland Heights. In 2000,
the cold-spots around Rocky River disperse in the southwest a bit. As for the hot-spots,
there is almost zero change between 1990 and 2000. Finally, in 2010 hot-spots emerge
near Painesville and expand around Lorain. Further, the hot-spot in downtown splits and
there is growth to the west and southwest as well as the northeast. The intensity around
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90/71/77 (Newburgh Heights?) diminishes and the cold-spots remain similar as in 2000 –
only Westlake emerges as a cold-spot.
Detroit
Unlike  many  other  metros,  Detroit’s  cold  spots  are  as  notable  as  their  hot-spots.
There are four areas surrounding Detroit with cold-spots in 1990. Broadly, these areas are
Livonia, Sterling Heights and Warren; more specifically: Redford to the west; West
Bloomfield to the northwest; Beverly Hills and Huntington Woods to the north; and
Warren, St. Clair Shores, and Grosse Point to the northeast. Hot-spots are found in
downtown Detroit – south of 8 Mile Road and east of Dearborn. Pontiac, to the northwest
of Detroit, also has a clustering of high poverty tracts.
The cold-spots remain and expand in 2000. Further, a new area – Southgate to the
south of the city – emerges. There is also growth to the west of Redford and Beverly Hills
expands north towards Bloomfield Hills. Hot-spots continue to cover the majority of
downtown and grow north and west towards 8 Mile Road and Highway 24. Finally, in
2010, the cold-spots continue to expand and intensify because the confidence level
increases. West Bloomfield, Plymoth and Redford nearly merge as the cold-spots move
south of West Bloomfield. Bloomfield Hills continues to intensify and there is an
emergence of cold-spots in Rochester Hills. The area between Warren and St. Clair
widens as the cold-spots retreat towards each community. Finally, the hot-spots move
slightly north and northwest as the central city intensity diminishes.
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Memphis
There are cold-spots near Germantown, TN, southeast of Memphis in 1990. The
hot-spots are found along the western side of Interstate-240 in downtown Memphis and
extends north and south throughout the city limits plus north of I-240. Further, hot-spots
are located on the western periphery.
Austin
Hot-spots emerge in downtown Austin and various suburban locations. There are
hot-spots in the southern portion of the metropolitan area near San Marcos and in
scattered areas to the east and northeast part of the metro area. Similar patterns are
present in 2000. Within the downtown area, the intensity is reduced but clusters remain in
the in similar locations. In 2010, clusters occur in fewer neighborhoods to the south, but
higher intensity within the tracts that do. There is a noticeable change in the clustering of
individuals in poverty near downtown Austin. Clustering moves north near Pflugerville,
east towards Walter E. Long Lake. The most noticeable change is the disappearance of
clustering east of Interstate-35, north of 7th Street and south of E 51st Street.
Denver
In 1990, there are hot-spots, signaling a high number of individuals in poverty,
along Santa Fe from the southwest into downtown Denver. There are also hot-spots along
east Colfax; and northeast of Denver near Commerce City. Three areas experience coldspots: east of I-225 in Aurora, Highlands Ranch in the south as well as an area near
Englewood.
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There is very little change between 1990 and 2000 for cold-spots or hot-spots in
Denver. Cold-spots continue in the same areas in 2000 as in 1990 with the emergence of
a small area west of Arvada. As for hot-spots, the east side expands north of Colfax.
Finally, in 2010, the growth of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods resulted in
increased hot-spots and cold-spots. Cold-spots expand from the areas in 1990 in 2000 and
the confidence levels increase, especially in Highlands Ranch. To the north and west, the
minor cold-spot from 2000 around Arvada expands in 2010 and cold-spots emerge in
Broomfield and Henderson. Hot-spots move north of Denver towards Westminster and
expand along I-225 corridor in Aurora. Lastly, the consistent hot-spot in the center of
downtown splits and a gap emerges between the hotspots along I-25 and I-225 from
Lincoln to Quebec, south of Colfax and towards City Park.
Seattle
In 1990 there are three distinct hot-spots in the Seattle metropolitan area. The hotspots are located around downtown Seattle, Tacoma and Everett. Also during this time,
there is cold-spot around Mill Creek. In 2000, the same general patterns are present, yet
the hot-spots near downtown Seattle move to the north and diminish slightly west of I-5
near the coast. The intensity, or confidence intervals of the tracts, increases around
Tacoma and expands to the south. Cold-spots emerge east of the city extending both
north and south. In 2010, the hot-spots near Tacoma contract. The hot-spots in downtown
Seattle diminish and move south as the previously southern boundary becomes a northern
boundary. Small clusters remain north of downtown and near the University of

90

Washington. Hot-spots continue around Everett. Cold-spots expand and/or merge along
the eastern boundary of Seattle.
Washington, DC
In 1990, there are cold spots west of Washington, DC near Washington Dulles
Airport, north in Ashburn, east of Herndon and to the south near Centerville. Hot-spots
dominate the eastern half plus much of the area near downtown, north of the Potomac
River. Hot-spots extend toward Silver Spring, College Park and Glendarden, Maryland
with a small cluster in southwest Arlington.
In 2000, the hot-spot in southwest Arlington expands greatly. The concentration
to the east remains and intensifies beyond DC boundary. Scattered cold-spots continue
around Washington Dulles Airport and emerge northwest of DC in Chevy Chase.
In 2010, the cold-spots expand from Chevy Chase and West of Alexandria.
Arlington experiences growth of cold spots and the area around Dulles expands. Hot-spot
continues to cover eastern half of District but areas emerge far north near Aspen Hill,
south of Gaithersburg, MD and to the far west near Manassas Park, VA.
The following section describes the results of each segregation measure regarding
the segregation of affluence. The section is organized in the same order as the segregation
of poverty.
Segregation of Affluence
Affluence Rate
The affluence rate reflects the percentage of household in the top income category
for each decennial census. In 1990, the top income bracket was household income greater
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than $150,000 and in 2000 and 2010, the threshold was $200,000 and above. Using this
threshold as a barometer for affluence means the affluent population constitutes a smaller
portion of the metropolitan populace than the poor residents. Results are in Figure 6.
Figure 9: Affluence Rates, 1990-2010
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The story of affluence rates is the story of Washington, DC. In 1990, Washington,
DC had an affluence rate of 3.17% and Buffalo had the lowest that decade at 0.9%. There
was no clear pattern between the strong and weak metro areas. The average affluence rate
in the strong metro areas was 1.97% and the weak average was 1.35%.
In 2000, the affluence rate for all eight metropolitan areas increased, but
Washington, DC (4.76%) and Buffalo (1.27%) remained the benchmarks. The average
affluence rate for the strong metropolitan areas increased to 3.18%. The gap between the
two groups widened slightly as the weaker metros average affluence rate in 2000 was
2.09%.
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For the third consecutive decade, Washington, DC had the highest affluence rate –
skyrocketing to 11.6% – and Buffalo had the lowest, 2.5%. The affluence rate increased
in all eight metros for the second decade in a row, but the stronger metros increased at a
much faster rate. In addition to Washington,  DC’s  explosion  to  11.6%, Austin, Seattle
and Denver all more than doubled the total number of affluent households in this period.
The strong metros each had affluence rates above 5.13% and none of the weaker metros
eclipsed 3.6%. The average affluence rate in stronger metros was 6.9%, more than twice
that of the weaker metros average, 3.13%.
To illustrate the difference of growth in affluent households between the two
groups, examine the effects of the higher affluence rate combined with the population
growth between 1990 and 2010. In 1990, when the population and affluence rate were
similar, the difference of affluent households was only 60,000. Between 1990 and 2010
in the stronger metropolitan areas, the total number of affluent households increased by
almost 700,000. Affluent households in the weaker metropolitan areas increased by just
under 160,000. As a result, the stronger metropolitan areas had roughly 600,000 more
affluent households than the weaker metropolitan areas in 2010.
Dissimilarity Index
As discussed in the segregation of poverty, the affluence rate of the metro does
influence how we interpret the dissimilarity values. On average, the affluence rates were
much lower than the poverty rates; the highest observed affluence rate was 11.6% and the
remaining 23 values were all below 5.7%. Thus, values  that  indicate  ‘evenness’  between  
affluent – non-affluent households must be lower than when discussing low-income
93

groups. In a scenario where the affluence rate is 6% and the non-affluence rate 94%, a
dissimilarity  value  of  .06  indicates  ‘evenness’.  
Figure 10: Dissimilarity Index, Affluence
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However, low values are not what we find. In fact, they exceed dissimilarity
values observed in the segregation of poverty despite affluence rates being less than half
the poverty rates. In 1990, Cleveland had the highest dissimilarity value, .64 and Seattle
had the lowest at .48. The weaker metropolitan areas all had values higher than .61 and as
a group, averaged .625. The stronger metro areas values were below .62, but averaged
.545 as a group.
The dissimilarity values decreased for all eight metropolitan areas in the 1990s.
This diminished the gap between the highest and lowest metro areas and between the two
groups. Denver, Detroit and Cleveland had the highest value, .52 and Seattle again had
the lowest of .45. The stronger metropolitan areas average value was .49 and the weaker
metro areas average was .515. Six of the eight metros had values of either .51 or .52; only
Seattle and Washington, DC had values below that threshold.
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In 2010, the gap between the strong and weak metropolitan areas increased.
Memphis had the highest dissimilarity value of .58. Seattle and DC again had the lowest
two values, each .43. Between 2000 and 2010, the weak metropolitan areas increased or
did not change. On the other hand, the stronger metro areas decreased or stabilized, aside
from Austin, which increased from .51 to .52. The weaker metros all had values greater
than .51 for the second consecutive decade, with an average value of .55. The strong
metros had values below .52, and an average of .47.
Given the significantly higher affluence rate of the stronger metros in 2010, this
relationship between strong and weak metros, and the degree of the relationship, is quite
surprising. Further, these trends occurred as the strong metropolitan areas experienced a
noteworthy increase in their affluence rates. What this relationship potentially suggests is
that the growing number of affluent households in the strong metro areas makes it easier
for high-income households to disperse throughout the metro area and still live in
relatively high-income neighborhoods. Additionally, in stagnant cities, neighborhoods
may be more strongly defined by socioeconomic status, culture or heritage. Without an
influx of new people, roles within the community are less likely to undergo change.
Future indices and other tests will provide an indication if these assumptions have merit.
Beyond the potential scenarios contributing to the division between the two groups, the
most notable result is the ability of affluent populations to segregate, despite constituting
such a small percentage of the population.
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Exposure Indices
The isolation index is a measure of how isolated the minority group (in this case,
high-income household) is from the majority. The isolation index value indicates the
likelihood an affluent household will live in the same neighborhood as other affluent
households. An index value of 1 indicates that all affluent households live in
neighborhoods of only affluent households.
Figure 11: Isolation Index, Affluence
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In 1990, Washington, DC and Detroit had the highest isolation value, .13. Seattle
and Buffalo had the lowest index, .06. There is no separation between the two groups of
metros, each range from .06 to .13 and the strong metros average isolation index value
was .09 and the weak metros were .1.
In 2000, Washington, DC had the highest isolation value, .14 and Buffalo
remained the lowest at .06. All four strong metropolitan areas increased between 1990
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and 2000, causing their average to increase from .09 to .11. The weaker metros average
decreased from .1 to .09.
Washington, DC and Buffalo continued to have the highest and lowest isolation
values  in  2010.  Buffalo’s  value  increased  from  .06  to  .08  and  Washington,  DC’s  isolation  
value jumped from .14 to .23, accompanying the rapid increase observed in the nation’s  
capital affluence rate. All eight metropolitan areas increased between 2000 and 2010. The
average for the strong metropolitan areas increased to .17 and the weaker metros climbed
to .12. Between 1990 and 2010, the stronger metros average nearly doubled, from .09 to
.17 while the weaker metropolitan areas increased modestly from .1 to .12. Despite lower
levels of unevenness, affluent households in the stronger metros are twice as isolated, on
average, as in the weaker metros.
Spatial Segregation Indices
While the dissimilarity index and isolation index are aspatial, three of the
segregation dimensions are spatial: concentration, clustering and centralization. To my
knowledge, these three indices have not been used to measure the segregation of
affluence; therefore, the value of this approach is unknown due to the lack of comparable
research. Results from the Absolute Concentration Index (ACO) are presented in Figure
12.The ACO ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher value corresponds with higher
segregation.
All eight metropolitan areas exhibited particularly high levels of concentration of
affluence, which I find interesting due to affluence usually occurring on the periphery in
larger census tracts with less population density. The ACO values range from .87 to .98
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in 1990. Denver and Seattle have the highest degree of concentration at .98, and
Cleveland the lowest at .87. There is not a clear division between the two groups, but the
stronger metropolitan areas have a higher average, .96 compared to .92.
Figure 12: Absolute Concentration Index, Affluence
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All eight metros exhibited a decline during the 1990s. Denver and Memphis had
the highest ACO values, .86, and Cleveland remained the lowest, declining to .84 in
2000. The strong metros averaged .94, and the weaker metros averaged .90.
For the second straight decade, all eight metros experienced a decline in ACO
values. Denver and Memphis remained as the metros with the highest values, .95, and for
the third straight decade, Cleveland experienced the lowest concentration of affluence,
with a value of .82. The weak metros average dropped to .88 and the strong metros to .91.
This consistent decline over the 20-year study period occurred as affluence rates and
isolation increased in these metropolitan areas.
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The Absolute Clustering Index (ACI) measures the degree to which poverty
neighborhoods adjoin one another. The ACI ranges from 0 to 1; the closer a value is to 1
indicates higher segregation. The results are presented in Figure 13.
Detroit and Washington, DC experienced the highest levels of clustering, .08, in
1990. The values are low, likely due to the small affluence rate in 1990 – there were not
enough affluent neighborhoods to cluster. Buffalo and Seattle had the lowest values, .02.
The weaker metropolitan areas averaged .05 and the strong metros .04.
Clustering increased in all metros, aside from Cleveland, during the 1990s.
Washington, DC (.09) and Buffalo (.03) remained the highest and lowest metropolitan
areas. The strong metropolitan areas average increased to .06 and the weak metros
remained at .05.
Figure 13: Absolute Clustering Index, Affluence
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Clustering increased in all eight metros during the 2000s. For the third
consecutive decade, Washington, DC and Buffalo exhibited the highest and lowest levels
of clustering. The averages of each group increased by .02 during this decade; the strong
metros to .08, and the weak metros to .07.
The Absolute Centralization Index (ACI), which measures the proximity of
individuals in poverty to the central city. The ACI ranges from -1 to 1; a positive value
indicates a high degree of centralization, a negative value indicates affluent households
are far from the central city, and a 0 indicates there is even dispersion throughout the
metropolitan area.
Figure 14: Absolute Centralization Index, Affluence
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Denver had the highest degree of centralization, .86, in 1990. Cleveland had the
lowest value, .61. There is a noticeable division between the two groups, aside from
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Memphis, the strong metropolitan areas had the four highest values. The strong
metropolitan areas averaged .82 while the weaker metros averaged .68.
Between 1990 and 2000, all eight metropolitan areas declined or remained the
same. Seattle joined Denver as the metro area with the highest ACE, .84, and Cleveland
remained the lowest at .57. Consequently, the averages for each group declined. The
strong and weak metros averaged .80 and .65, respectively.
The Absolute Centralization Index declined in all eight metros for the second
consecutive decade. Denver and Seattle remained the highest at .83, and Cleveland had
the lowest ACE for the third consecutive decade. The strong metros average declined to
.78 while the weak metros average dropped to .61. It is important to note Denver
consistently high values in all three decade for both the segregation of poverty and
affluence, raising the possibility that the results are a product of the index as much as
they are a result of the data.
High- and Extreme-Affluence Neighborhoods
I mapped the concentration of affluence at two different thresholds, 20-39%
(high-affluence) and greater than 40% (extreme-affluence). Affluence rates are lower
than poverty rates therefore I anticipate fewer numbers of high- and extreme-affluence
neighborhoods, yet any neighborhood that does reach these thresholds illustrates
concentrations of an incredibly small minority.
I present the results of extreme-affluence neighborhoods using total numbers due
to the small number of tracts that qualify. To discuss high-affluence neighborhoods, I use
percentages and total numbers. The percentages correct for the wide range of census
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tracts within each metropolitan area and raw numbers are important due to the small
numbers of high-affluence tracts in many metro areas.
Extreme-affluence neighborhoods
Washington, DC had the highest number of extreme-affluence census tracts all
three decades and until 2010, the only metro area to have a noteworthy percentage. In
1990, eight, or 0.59% of the census tracts in Washington, DC were extreme-affluence
neighborhoods. In that same decade, Austin, Seattle, Memphis and Buffalo all had zero
neighborhoods.
Table 7: Extreme-Affluence Census Tracts
1990
Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis
Austin
Denver
Seattle
Washington
DC

0
1
1
0
0
2
0
8

2000
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
8

2010 total
CT
0
297
2
635
2
1297
0
312
3
350
6
621
3
719
67
1347

In 2000, Washington, DC had eight extreme-affluence neighborhoods for the
second consecutive decade. Cleveland lost its one neighborhood of extreme-affluence,
joining Buffalo, Memphis and Seattle with zero extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Austin
gained 1.
There  was  noticeable  change  in  2010  data.  Washington,  DC’s  number  of  extremeaffluence  neighborhoods  exploded  from  8  to  67,  constituting  4.97%  of  the  district’s  
census tracts. Buffalo and Memphis had zero for the third straight decade. All growth
pales in comparison to DC, but, the other three strong metropolitan areas experienced
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growth in the number of extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Denver increased from 2 to 6,
Austin from 1 to 3 and Seattle from 0 to 3. The weaker metros combined to have four,
two in Cleveland and Detroit, respectively. The strong metropolitan areas average
percentage of extreme-affluence neighborhoods was 1.8%, while the weaker metropolitan
areas was only 0.12%. The margins are small when excluding DC, but the increase in
concentration of affluent households occurs mostly in the strong metropolitan areas.
High-affluence neighborhoods
Washington, DC leads the way in high-affluence census tracts, as well. In 1990,
DC had 26 – 1.93% – neighborhoods with affluence rates between 20 and 39%. Detroit
had the second most, 19 neighborhoods, 1.47%. On the low end, Memphis had zero highaffluence neighborhoods, Buffalo had one, and Austin and Seattle each had 2.
Table 8: High-Affluence Census Tracts
1990

2000

1
5
19
0
2
3
2
26

1
7
31
2
7
17
14
57

Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis
Austin
Denver
Seattle
Washington
DC

2010 total
CT
1
297
11
635
46
1297
9
312
18
350
34
621
29
719
194
1347

Washington, DC had 57 high-affluence neighborhoods, 4.23% of  the  metro’s  
tracts, in 2000. Buffalo had 1 high-affluence neighborhood and Memphis had 2. As a
result of the small number in 1990, seven metropolitan areas increased their number of
high-affluence neighborhoods; Buffalo had one again. The strong metropolitan areas
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higher affluence neighborhoods constituted, on average, 2.73% of the metros tracts and
the weaker metros averaged 1.12%.
Figure 15: High-Affluence Neighborhoods, as a Percent of Total Census Tracts
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Finally, Washington experienced a rapid growth in high-affluence neighborhoods
in 2010, just as in extreme-affluence neighborhoods. In 2010, DC had 194 high-affluence
neighborhoods, 14.4% of the metro area’s census tracts. Buffalo remained on the low end
with only one high-affluence neighborhood for the third consecutive decade. Mimicking
the trend of extreme-affluence, the disparity between the strong and weak metropolitan
areas grew in 2010. The strong metropolitan areas all had more than 4% of their census
tracts classified as high-affluence, while no weak metro area had a percentage higher than
3.55%. The stronger metropolitan areas averaged 7.26% and 2.72% for the weaker
metros. Aside from Buffalo, the seven metros each noticed an increase in the
concentration of affluent households, but the magnitude of the growth which took place
between the two groups is wide.
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High- and Extreme-Affluence Neighborhoods
Overall, in 1990 and 2000, there was only minor separation between the two
groups in the concentration of affluence, at the high- and extreme- threshold. Denver and
Seattle noticed a small increase in high-affluence neighborhoods in 2000, but the
disparity that did exist between the two groups at any other point could be attributed
largely to Washington, DC. However, a clear division emerges in 2010 when considering
the number of high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Only 2.84% of the census
tracts in the weaker metropolitan areas had concentration levels of affluence higher than
20%. On the other hand, 9.06% of the strong metropolitan  areas’  census  tracts  were  
classified as high- or extreme-affluence. The growth of affluent household between 1990
and 2010 in the strong metropolitan areas contributed to higher rates of affluence
metropolitan wide and the clustering of those populations.
Spatial Patterns of Concentrated affluence
The spatial patterns of concentrated affluence are less notable because of the
small number of high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Below is a summary of the
patterns observed.
Buffalo
Buffalo has only one – the same one – high-affluence tract each decade. The tract
is located northeast of Buffalo near the area of East Amherst. The percentage of affluent
households in the tract each decade is 20.6% in 1990, 21.7% in 2000 and 25.4% in 2010.
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Cleveland
Concentrated affluence is located near the eastern suburbs – Shaker Heights,
Gates Mills and Chagrin Falls – of Cleveland in 1990. These core areas remain the
location of concentrated affluence neighborhoods in 2000 and 2010 and the seven new
neighborhoods that emerge over the two-decade span are located in these areas.
Detroit
Detroit had the second highest number, 20, of neighborhoods exceeding 20%
affluence in 1990 and they were located to the northwest of Detroit near Bloomfield. The
location did not change significantly in 2000 or 2010; the total number of tracts more
than doubled over the 20-year period and grew from Bloomfield to the north and
southwest.
Memphis
Memphis had zero neighborhoods of concentrated affluence in 1990. The two
tracts that appear in 2000 are southeast of Memphis near Germantown. In 2010, the
number expands to nine and a linear group of tracts forms along Poplar Avenue
(Highway 72) from eastern Memphis to Germantown.
Austin
Austin’s  two  concentrated affluence neighborhoods are west of downtown near
Rollingwood and West Lake Hills in 1990. As the number grows to 8 in 2000, one of the
neighborhoods from 1990 becomes extreme and surrounding neighborhoods emerge as
high-affluence tracts. Affluent neighborhoods increase from 8 to 21 and the growth
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continues west of Austin. As the number of neighborhoods more than doubles, the
growth spreads from the original 1990 neighborhoods in all cardinal directions.
Denver
Denver’s  high- and extreme-affluence neighborhoods are located in Cherry Hills
Village in 1990. As the number of tracts increases nearly four-fold by 2000, the area
expands, but they persist largely to the south of Denver and 470. Of note, three tracts near
Washington Park and Capital Hill, southeast of downtown, emerge as high-affluence
neighborhoods. The number of neighborhoods increased from 19 to 40 by 2010 and
growth continues to take place south of Denver along the periphery and an additional
tract emerges near Washington Park.
Seattle
The only concentrated affluence tracts in 1990 are east of Seattle on Lake
Washington near Clyde Hill and in 2000, additional tracts emerge in a similar area. In
2010, Seattle’s  increase  of concentrated affluence neighborhoods, from 14 to 32, grows
to the east of downtown. The original two high-affluence tracts in 1990 are extremeaffluence by 2010.
Washington, DC
In 1990, the other seven metropolitan areas have a total of 34 concentrated
affluence neighborhoods, Washington DC has 34. The majority these tracts are located
northwest of DC near Potomac, MD and extend towards the western boundary. There is a
similar pattern in 2000, but a noticeable increase in the total number of tracts that spread
in all directions from the 1990 concentrated affluence neighborhoods. In 2010, there is
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noticeable growth, to 261 tracts, throughout the metro area.  Potomac,  Tyson’s  Corner  and  
McLean are filled with extreme-affluence neighborhoods. Neighborhoods emerge
southwest of DC in Fairfax, VA and near Brookeville, MD.
Spatial Statistics
Global Moran’s  I
Global  Moran’s  I  is  a  measure  of  spatial  autocorrelation  – it evaluates the
clustering of both high and low values. Global  Moran’s  I  is  an  inferential  statistic  and  can  
be evaluated based on the z-score. The null hypothesis of the Global  Moran’s  I  is that the
spatial distribution is random. A statistically insignificant z-score indicates we can not
reject the null hypothesis, and spatial patterns of the dataset are a random process. A
statistically significant z-score indicates either clustering or dispersal beyond random
processes. If the z-score is statistically significant, we can reject the null hypothesis. The
direction (positive or negative) of the z-score  and  the  Moran’s  Index  will  correspond.  If
the z-score is a statistically significant positive  value,  and  the  Moran’s  Index  is  positive,
we reject the null hypothesis because the high and/or low values are more clustered than
can be expected from a true random process. If the z-score is a statistically significant
negative  value,  and  the  Moran’s  Index is negative, we can also reject the null hypothesis,
however in this case because the high and low values are more dispersed than would be
expected from a random selection. The z-score  and  Moran’s  Index  should  be  evaluated  
only in relation to another decade of the same metropolitan area, and not in comparison to
other metros due to the variation in number of census tracts and spatial units.
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Table  9  includes  the  Moran’s  Index  and  z-score for each metropolitan area in
1990, 2000, and 2010. The italicized  number  below  the  Moran’s  Index  is  the  z-score for
the dataset. To test the spatial autocorrelation of affluence, I used the total number of
households in the top income bracket for each decade.
Table  9:  Global  Moran’s  I,  Affluent  Households
Austin
Denver
Seattle
Washington DC
Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis

1990

2000

2010

0.38

0.29

0.02

10.15**

7.619**

5.47**

0.26

0.25

0.31

12.27**

11.38**

14.1**

0.27

0.32

0.34

11.41**

13.3**

14.04**

0.33

0.36

0.37

26.00**

27.97**

28.38**

0.10

0.07

0.16

3.72**

2.52*

5.299**

0.19

0.18

0.21

11.00**

10.12**

11.3**

0.28

0.30

0.32

20.79**

21.81**

23.17**

0.30

0.03

0.17

7.7**

6.64**

4.38**

** indicates statistically significant at the 99%
* indicates statistically significant at the 95%

Buffalo, NY had a statistically significant positive z-score – indicating the high
and/or low values are clustered in 1990 and 2010. In 2000 Buffalo had a positive z-score
but significant only at the 95% interval. The remaining seven metropolitan areas
experienced a positive z-score indicating spatial clustering above the 99% confidence
interval,  therefore  I  believe  Buffalo’s  lower  value  in  2000  is  noteworthy.  Due  to  the  
particularly high z-scores of spatial autocorrelation for both poverty and affluence, the
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global  Moran’s  I  make  it  challenging  to  determine  if  high  and/or  low  values  are  
contributing to the spatial autocorrelation.
Getis-Ord General G
The Getis-Ord General G measures if high or low values cluster. The General G
interprets values in relation to the expected value. The null hypothesis of the General G is
no spatial clustering. If the General G yields a statistically significant z-score we are able
to reject the null hypothesis. A statistically significant positive z-score indicates high
values are more clustered than can be expected from a truly random sample. Statistically
significant negative z-scores indicate the low-values are spatially clustered more than can
be expected from a truly random sample. The observed General G ranges from 0-1; the
closer to 1 indicates high values are clustered, and closer to 0 indicates low values are
clustered, however, the z-score must be significant in order to reject the null hypothesis.
In Table 10, the z-score is the italicized value below Observed General G for each
metropolitan area in 1990, 2000, and 2010. The Getis-Ord General G measuring
affluence presents the most interesting results of either global spatial statistic measuring
poverty  or  affluence.  Buffalo’s  hot-spot analysis produced non-statistically significant zscores all three decades therefore I fail to reject the null hypothesis, which means the
distribution of affluent households is one of the possible spatially random scenarios.
High-values clustered in Denver and Detroit in 1990 and 2000 but were randomly
distributed in 2010. Austin and Memphis each experienced high-value clusters in 1990
but random distribution in 2000 and 2010. High values clustered in Seattle and
Washington, DC all three decades studied. Finally, Cleveland presents arguably the most
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interesting pattern. High values clustered in 1990, the distribution of affluent households
in 2000 was random and in 2010, Cleveland exhibited clustering of low-values by
producing a statistically significant negative value.
Table 10: Getis-Ord General G, Affluent Households
Column1
Austin
Denver
Seattle
Washington DC
Buffalo
Cleveland
Detroit
Memphis

1990

2000

2010

0.04

0.01

0.01

6.33**

1.67

-0.40

0.02

0.02

0.01

8.82**

4.43**

2.35*

0.01

0.01

0.01

5.09**

5.06**

4.77**

0.01

0.01

0.01

10.14**

8.08**

2.78*

0.03

0.02

0.02

0.65

-0.45

-1.18

0.02

0.01

0.01

2.86**

-1.12

-2.2**

0.01

0.00

0.01

8.33**

2.67**

1.60

0.03

0.02

0.01

4.69**

2.55*

0.57

** indicates statistically significant at the 99%
* indicates statistically significant at the 95%

Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I
Anselin’s  Local  Moran’s  I  is  the  local  version  of  the  Global  Moran’s  I.  Simply,  it  
measures clustering at the local level and indicates, feature by feature, if a census tract is
positively or negatively correlated with nearby census tracts. The test determines if there
is a spatial cluster (of high or low values) or spatial outlier based on the expected
distribution.
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Buffalo
Tracts with a high number of affluent households near similar tracts, High/High,
are located north of Interstate-90 near East Amherst. There is also a small group of
High/High tracts near Orchard Park in the southern part of the metro area. In 2000, the
area near East Amherst is the only area exhibiting spatial autocorrelation. The area near
Orchard Park re-emerges after its hiatus in 2000.
Cleveland
High/High clusters are located east of Cleveland in Shaker Heights and extend to
further eastern suburbs. High/High tracts are also present near the western suburbs of
Westlake, Bay Village and Rocky River. In 2000, there is little change on the east side,
but a slight increase in the number of tracts in the previously discussed areas on the west
side. In 2010, there is a split on the west side between Rocky River and growth further
towards the periphery. On the east side, a bit of a checkerboard pattern emerges, but
similar distribution to 2000.
Detroit
Areas with high number of affluent households near similar tracts were located
around Bloomfield, to the northwest of Detroit, and further north, in 1990. Bloomfield
remains the core area of High/High tracts and there is growth to the northeast and
southwest. The area to the southwest potentially is linked to  Ann  Arbor’s  economy,  
which is closer than Detroit. In 2010, there is continued growth around clusters observed
in the previous decade.
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Memphis
A linear pattern of High/High tracts extending from eastern Memphis to the
southeast past Germantown is present in 1990. The pattern is apparent again in 2000 with
some additional growth – extending north – east of Cordova. In 2010, there is a minor
separation between the previously linked group and the most eastern section extends
north.
Austin
High-affluence neighborhoods are surrounded by high-affluence neighborhoods
in the western part of Austin all three decades. In 1990, High/High tracts are located
along western Austin and in 2000 the growth occurs further west. In 2010, growth
continues along the western periphery to the southwest of the cluster observed in the
previous decade.
Denver
The cluster High/High neighborhoods in 1990 is located around the intersection
of Interstate-225 and Interstate-25. Further, there is a cluster in southeast of downtown
Denver near Washington Park. In 2000, High/High clusters move south and more clusters
emerge in the southern area. Although it diminishes slightly, there is a similar pattern
near Washington Park as well as growth on the western periphery. Finally, in 2010, the
clusters in the southeastern part of Denver, and further south. Finally, the area near
Washington Park grows beyond its previous extent observed in 1990.
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Seattle
In 1990, there are High/High clusters in downtown Seattle and the significant
number of tracts is located in Bellevue, east of Seattle. Further, there are scattered
High/Low tracts in the southern metro area, indicating there are a small number of tracts
with high numbers of affluent households in an area generally characterized as having
limited affluent households. The areas of High/High clusters extend to the north and east
in 2000, while Low/Low tracts are prominent in the southern metropolitan area. The only
slight change in 2010 is further eastward expansion of High/High tracts.
Washington, DC
In 1990, High/High clusters are located northwest of DC, extending from central
DC to Potomac. There are also small groups southwest of DC in Fairfax, VA; northwest
in Brookeville, MD and west near Oakton, VA. In 2000, the northwest quadrant grows
north, west and southwest towards Oakton to narrow the spatial gap. The areas near
Fairfax and Brookeville both expand. Lastly, in 2010 there is continued growth to the
west and near Fairfax. Low/Low clusters, signaling tracts with low numbers of affluent
households are near areas with similar attributes, are present on the east side of DC near
the fringe and inside I-495 in places such as Forest Heights, Temple Hills, Fairmont
Heights and Tacoma Park.
Getis Gi*
Getis Gi* is the local test of Getis-Ord General G. The Gi* indicates hot-spots, or
areas where there is spatial clustering of high values. The test also indicates cold-spots,
which are areas were there is spatial clustering of low values. To be clear, cold-spots due
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not signal poor areas, cold-spots only indicate clustering of tracts with low-numbers of
affluent houses.
Buffalo
In 1990, hot-spots of affluent households are northeast of Buffalo, extending from
inside I-290 to East Amherst and in the south near Orchard Park. Although there is a
reduction in tracts near Orchard Park, the same geographic patterns are present in 2000.
In 2010, the hot-spots remain in similar locations and cold-spots appear east of downtown
Buffalo.
Cleveland
Hot-spots are found on the east side and west side of Cleveland. The eastern
suburbs of Shaker Heights, Beachwood, Hunting Valley and near the western suburbs
along the shore of Lake Erie in Rocky River and Bay Village. Cold-spots are found east
of downtown. In 2000, the hot-spots on the west side expand further west and south.
There is an increase in the number tracts experiencing hot-spots in 2000, but not a
significant geographical shift. The intensity of cold-spots increases and expands to the
south and east of the tracts observed in 1990. New cold-spots emerge south of Interstate90. In 2010, the cold-spots continue spreading and cover much of the central city while
the hot-spots remain similar with some growth.
Detroit
Detroit experiences hot-spots and cold-spots in 1990. Hot-spots, areas with
clusters of tracts with high numbers of affluent households, are located around
Bloomfield to the northwest of Detroit and near Grosse Point on Lake St. Clair just north
115

of downtown. Cold-spots, with low intensity, are located in downtown Detroit. In 2000,
hot-spots extend northeast and southwest from Bloomfield and remain in Grosse Point.
The cold-spots in downtown area expand geographically to the west and northwest and
increase in intensity. These trends from 2000 to 2010 mimic those observed in the
previous decade. By 2010, the cold-spots encompassing the downtown are as noteworthy
and prominent as the hot-spots.
Memphis
A linear pattern of hot-spots are present from east Memphis to Germantown in
1990 and the same pattern persists in 2000, but there is a slight retreat away from
Memphis. The core pattern persists in 2010 and the eastern boundary expands slightly
north and south.
Austin
As indicated via the concentrated affluence neighborhoods and Morans I, the hotspots of affluence are in the western part of the Austin metropolitan area near
Rollingwood and West Lake Hills. The hot-spots perpetuate in this area in 2000 and there
is some growth further west and north. Finally, in 2010 hot-spots remain in similar
locations and expand to the south and west, in addition tracts to the north of Austin near
Round Rock emerge. Further, isolated cold-spots indicating low number of affluent
households emerge to the east of Interstate-35, primarily southeast of the city.
Denver
Hot-spots are in the southeastern part of Denver and to the east of Interstate-25
near Glendale to Colfax Avenue in 1990. There are similar patterns in 2000 and
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additional growth to the southeast of the city as well as isolated cold spots throughout the
city. In 2010, hot-spots perpetuate in similar areas as the previous two decades and there
is additional growth in the southern metropolitan area. Further, cold-spots are located
throughout Aurora and west of Interstate-25 from west Denver to Westminster.
Seattle
In 1990, hot-spots are east of Seattle in Bellevue and in the western part of
downtown Seattle with a few tracts to the north. The intensity of near downtown tracts
increased in 2000 and there is growth south of downtown near the coast while the area
near Bellevue expands north. In 2010, there is a similar distribution of hot-spots and
continued expansion in east. Further, cold-spots emerge in Tacoma in the southern part of
the Seattle Metropolitan area.
Washington, DC
Hot-spots and cold-spots are present in Washington DC each decade. In 1990,
hot-spots range from downtown DC to the northwest near Potomac, MD and to the
southwest near Fairfax, VA. Cold-spots are located along the eastern half of DC
extending in all directions. Most notably outside of DC is an area near Silver Springs,
MD. In 2000, hot-spots remain in similar locations but increase south of the 1990 cluster
– west of DC. A small hot-spot is located in Alexandria, VA to the south of DC, and west
of the Potomac River. The cold-spots in 2000 remain and grow outwards with increased
intensity in comparison to 1990. Finally, in 2010, the hot-spots continue spreading west
of DC towards the periphery and continue to the southwest. The cold-spots intensify in
the eastern half of DC and grow north, south and east of the clusters in 2000. Further,
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isolated groups of cold-spots are north of DC near Gaithersburg in Kensington, just north
of the beltway.
Site Visits: Affluent Centers on the Periphery
I visited two of the strong metropolitan areas, Austin and Denver, to compare
neighborhoods that, according to the data, exhibited similar patterns. Affluent census
tracts in Austin and Denver demonstrated relatively equal patterns of growth during the
study period. In 1990, affluent neighborhoods constituted less than 1% of the census
tracts and in 2010, each metro area had greater than 6%. Additionally, the affluent tracts
observed in 1990 remained affluent throughout the study period, and the growth of
wealthy neighborhoods over the past twenty years spread from these original
neighborhoods. The neighborhoods I visited in Austin were Rollingwood and West Lake
Hills, located in the western part of the Austin MSA. In Denver, I visited Cherry Hills
Village, to the southeast of the city. No two neighborhoods are the same, yet the
similarities between the neighborhoods, particularly neighborhoods over 900 miles apart,
are striking.
The obvious parallel was the fortification around neighborhoods, and to a lesser
degree within the neighborhood, around the majority of homes. In some cases this
fortification was evident through walls and gates, but at the very least, neighborhoods
were separated by walls of urban forests and dense plantings. Illustrations are included in

118

Figure 16: Denver, CO

Figure 17: Austin, TX

Figure 18: Denver, CO

Figure 19: Austin, TX

Figure 20: Denver, CO

Figure 21: Austin, TX

Figure 22: Denver, CO

Figure 23: Austin, TX
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Figures 16-19. Three other similarities were apparent: each neighborhood was anchored
by a strong elementary school; well-maintained greenspace (Figures 20 & 21); and public
signage was frequent, new, and detailed (Figures 22 & 23). These similarities are three
public goods concentrated within a small number of neighborhoods. Arguably, public
goods should be available to all members of a community, and not reserved for the
affluent. Additionally, further examination may reveal the fortification around
neighborhoods was supported with public money, illustrating an even greater divide
between affluent and non-affluent neighborhoods.
These similarities across different urban spaces reveal the benefits isolation offers
affluent populations. Other patterns such as large homes, high-end cars, and wellmanicured lawns were also present, but those are all private market functions. The
heightened quality of public goods recognizable in these neighborhoods compared to
general observation throughout other neighborhoods of both cities is not the product of a
democracy. While affluent neighborhoods clearly label the appropriate distance from a
park along the highway (Figure 23), low-income neighborhoods lack greenspace of any
type. Public goods are not being distributed equitably.
These site visits were brief and only a small portion of this larger product, yet the
similarities between these neighborhoods, the centers of affluence in both cities for the
past twenty years, clearly demonstrate preconceived notions about the disparity between
affluent and non-affluent neighborhoods.
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Chapter Five: Discussion
The results illustrate the importance of methodology in segregation research. The
different measures of segregation indicate unique patterns, and in some cases, different
relationships altogether. Methodological differences aside, four broad conclusions can be
garnered from this research. First, income segregation is increasing and the number of
moderate-income neighborhoods is declining. Second, weaker metropolitan areas are
more segregated by income than strong metropolitan areas. Third, opposing income
extremes contribute to segregation in the two groups of metros: the segregation of
poverty is higher in weaker metropolitan areas, while the segregation of affluence is
higher in stronger metropolitan areas. Lastly, despite the suburbanization of poverty,
poverty remains a near-urban phenomenon and is not being displaced by neighborhoods
of affluence.
Income Segregation Increases between 1990 and 2000
Income segregation increased between 1990 and 2010. In line with other scholars,
there is an evaporation of middle class neighborhoods and it is attributable to the growing
segregation of affluence (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a; Fry and Taylor 2012). There are
an increasing percentage of neighborhoods classified as high- or extreme-income, and the
isolation of affluence is growing. Aside from the dissimilarity index, all measures reveal
an increasing segregation of affluence in the metropolitan areas examined. The statistical
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approaches measuring the segregation of poverty present unique and inconsistent
patterns, and the trends vary between groups.
The loss of moderate-income neighborhoods (those not classified as high- or
extreme-poverty/affluence) is reflected in metropolitan areas exhibiting weak and strong
growth. In 1990, the average percentage of high- or extreme-poverty neighborhoods for
the eight metropolitan areas was 18.9% and the average percentage of high- or extremeaffluence neighborhoods was .9%. In 2010, however, those percentages increased to
25.2% and 5.7%, respectively, meaning the number of non high- or extreme-income
neighborhoods decreased from 80.2% in 1990 to 69.1% in 2010.
The isolation index also reveals an increase in segregation. The segregation of
poverty is stagnant over the twenty-year period, but there is an increase in the segregation
of affluence, indicating increased residential sorting among affluent households. Despite
remaining high, the dissimilarity index indicates a decline in unevenness of both poverty
and affluence over the twenty-year period.
These broad trends characterize the increase of income segregation for the eight
metropolitan areas as a collective group. Additionally, this increased segregation is
observed in each group of metropolitan areas; and to answer the direct research question,
the increase of income segregation is greater in the weaker metropolitan areas.
Weaker Metropolitan Areas Exhibit Greater Segregation
In contrast to my hypothesis, weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher degrees of
income segregation than stronger metropolitan areas. Weaker metropolitan areas saw the
share of non high- or extreme-income neighborhoods decline from 74.8% in 1990 to
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64.5% in 2010. In comparison, the percentage declined from 86.2% to 74.1% in stronger
metropolitan areas.
The segregation indices present a similar, but more complex, relationship.
Regarding the dissimilarity index, the weaker metropolitan areas have higher levels of
unevenness in all three decades, for both poverty and affluence. The lower levels of
unevenness  in  the  stronger  metropolitan  areas  align  with  Massey  and  Denton’s  (1993)  
discussion on racial segregation. Places with lower rates of minorities exhibit lower
degrees  of  unevenness  because  neighborhood  composition  remains  within  the  majority’s  
tolerance and fears are muted due to lack of potential in-migration (Massey and Denton
1993). The segregation of affluence is decreasing between 1990 and 2010 for both groups
of metro areas. As for the segregation of poverty, the dissimilarity index is decreasing in
the weaker metros, and increasing in the stronger metropolitan areas. The isolation index
presents a mixed bag. The weaker metropolitan areas exhibit greater segregation of
poverty than the stronger metropolitan areas, but the gap between the two groups
narrowed over the twenty-year period.
In each of these cases, the higher levels of income segregation in the weaker
metropolitan areas are attributable to their legacy of higher segregation in 1990. Despite
the weaker metropolitan areas higher income segregation, high- and low-income groups
contribute to income segregation within the two groups of metros in considerably
different ways. The greater income segregation within weaker metropolitan areas is
related to greater segregation of poverty, whereas the segregation of affluence is greater
in the stronger metropolitan areas.
123

Segregation of Poverty is Higher in Weak Metros
Weaker metropolitan areas have higher segregation of poverty than stronger
metros. The encouraging news of poverty decline in the 1990s is reflected in the analysis
(Jargowsky 2003). Unfortunately, the discouraging news indicating growth in poverty
during the 2000s is also reflected in the analysis (Kneebone et al. 2010a). The segregation
of poverty declined in the 1990s, but returned in the 2000s to surpass levels observed in
1990. After a decline in extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 1990s, the number
increased in the 2000s beyond 1990 levels. The stronger metropolitan areas experience a
decline in high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods in the 1990s, but the values
observed in 2010 eclipsed 1990 levels. In weaker metropolitan areas a neighborhood is
almost two times as likely to be considered high- or extreme-poverty (33.3% to 16.9% in
2010). This disparity is amplified in extreme-poverty neighborhoods; 10.9% of
neighborhoods are extreme-poverty in weaker metropolitan areas, and only 2.6% in
stronger metropolitan areas.
The segregation indices tell a similar story, but do reveal an interesting fact about
the trends of the segregation of poverty. Examining the dissimilarity index or isolation
index values, the weaker four metropolitan areas have higher values in all three decades
however, the two groups are (slightly) trending in different directions. The weaker metros
experienced a decline, and the stronger metros an increase, in both segregation indices
between 1990 and 2010.
This lower level of segregation of poverty in stronger metropolitan areas may be
related to the growth of the high-income group, therefore diminishing the gap between
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low-income and middle-income groups (Reardon and Bischoff 2011b). The growth, and
accompanying segregation of affluence is reflected in the next section.
Segregation of Affluence Higher in Strong Metros
The segregation of affluence is increased in both groups of metropolitan areas
during the study period, but increased faster in the stronger metros. This increase of
segregation is accompanied by a period of nearly all income growth occurring within
high-income households (Fry and Taylor 2012). Consequently, the stronger metropolitan
areas, which have an affluence rate twice that of the weaker metropolitan areas, has
considerably higher segregation of affluence. Affluent households are more isolated in
stronger metros and are four times as likely to have high- or extreme-affluence
neighborhoods. Just as in the segregation of poverty, the dissimilarity index is an outlier.
Otherwise, all measures – isolation index, high-, extreme-, and high-and extremeaffluence neighborhoods – reveal a higher segregation of affluence in the stronger
metropolitan areas.
Segregation of Affluence v. Segregation of Poverty
Although recent research reveals higher levels of segregation of affluence than
segregation of poverty, that cannot be confirmed in this study (Dwyer 2009; Reardon and
Bischoff 2011a; Reardon and Bischoff 2011b: Fry and Taylor 2012). As stated above, the
segregation of affluence is responsible for the increasing income segregation in the eight
metropolitan areas – and each group – since 1990, but the isolation index and the number
of high- and extreme-poverty neighborhoods demonstrates greater segregation of poverty
than affluence. As discussed earlier, the dissimilarity index bucks the trend. According to
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the dissimilarity index, there is a greater unevenness between affluent and non-affluent
populations than there is between poor and non-poor populations.
The isolation values are similar, however, the number of high-and extremeaffluence neighborhoods is a fraction compared to poverty neighborhoods. Potentially,
this research contradicts with previous studies due to unique calculations of affluence.
Reardon and Bischoff (2011a and 2011b) consider households in the 90th percentile of
income as affluent. Fry and Taylor (2012) consider affluent households as those at twice
the median household income. Given the gap between poverty and affluence rates
included in this study, it is possible a more even distribution between the two income
groups would result in higher segregation of affluence. Despite this likelihood,
reclassifying income thresholds to make the distribution more even does not change the
distribution of income it only changes the parameters with which we classify the income.
Changing the classification would mute the current income disparities in the United
States.
Suburbanization of Poverty Remains “Near-urban”
The suburbanization of poverty may have dispersed from primary cities into
neighboring jurisdictions, but low-income individuals remain clustered near urban
centers. Broadly, the two local spatial statistics and high-poverty neighborhoods show
poverty areas remain near large, urban centers. The majority of poverty observed beyond
urban centers are located in two places: far on the periphery in places easily considered
rural with little affiliation to the urban core, demonstrated in places such as Memphis and
Austin; and secondly, in secondary cities outside of primary cities such as in Tacoma,
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Washington; Aurora, CO; Erie, NY; and Silver Springs, MD. Locals may argue these
places are urban centers, but in a classic central city-suburban area dichotomy, these
places are often classified as suburbs in research.
This conclusion does not offer a sharp contrast to existing literature on the
suburbanization of poverty; rather it supports it and provides visual evidence of the
location of poverty clusters. The suburbanization of poverty rhetoric may insinuate
concentrations of poverty far from urban cores, but that is indicative of perceptions about
suburban places rather than the actual location. The suburbanization of poverty indicates
poverty is changing jurisdictional boundaries, and signals the importance of prescribing
policies that meet the needs of low-income individuals in municipalities unequipped to
meet the needs of this growing population.
Additionally, in contradiction to my hypothesis, affluent neighborhoods did not
emerge in the urban core to the degree I anticipated in the metropolitan areas investigated
in this study. Austin, Seattle and Washington, DC, however, did experience a higher
number of affluent neighborhoods near the central city in 2010 than in 1990.
Additionally, there were instances where urban neighborhoods did transition from highpoverty areas to no poverty over the twenty-year period in multiple metropolitan areas.
These events occurred in places such as Austin and Washington, DC. Additionally,
affluent  households  persisted  near  Denver’s  urban  core  in  the Washington Park
neighborhood. These transitioning neighborhoods present interesting case studies for
future research. On the periphery, many of the affluent neighborhoods served as
epicenters for the growth of additional affluent neighborhoods. Future research can
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investigate if urban neighborhoods complete the transition from poverty to affluent, and
become centers of newly established pods of wealth.
Spatial Statistics as an approach to segregation
The local spatial statistics offer a unique platform to visualize clusters of
segregation, however, they do not present a quantitative mechanism to easily demonstrate
results beyond that visualization and interpretation. A unique corollary between Getis
Gi*,  Local  Moran’s  I,  and  the  mapping  of  high- and extreme-income groups was the
ability of the two local spatial statistics to highlight areas of future high- or extremepoverty  and/or  affluence.  The  Local  Moran’s  I  or  Getis  Gi*  highlighted  areas  of  spatial  
clustering at one period that emerged as high- or extreme- income neighborhood in one of
the subsequent decades. This is true for high poverty areas in Washington, DC and
Seattle. It was more valuable, however, to visualize clusters of affluence. There were few
neighborhoods classified as high- or extreme-affluence, particularly in 1990, yet clusters
indicated by the spatial statistics emerged as areas of high-affluence by 2010 in metros
such as Austin, Seattle, Denver, Memphis, and Washington, DC. Local spatial statistics
prove to be a valuable asset towards visualizing the processes of segregation in a
metropolitan area and also demonstrate a clear picture of where clusters take place.
The global statistics, however, did not provide great insight into the spatial
patterns of poverty or affluence. The high rate of statistical significant clustering failed to
produce useful findings between the metropolitan areas. Further research should be
incorporated to improve the selection of distance bands for segregation analysis.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
This research yielded four conclusions. First, this study supports recent research
suggesting income segregation is increasing. Second, weaker metropolitan areas
experience higher income segregation than strong metropolitan areas. Third, weaker
metropolitan areas have higher segregation of poverty while stronger metropolitan areas
have higher segregation of affluence. Lastly, poverty remains a near-urban phenomenon
and is not being displaced by neighborhoods of affluence.
Income segregation is increasing due to the growing segregation of affluence.
There is a consistent decline in the number of moderate-income neighborhoods in the
metropolitan areas examined here, as neighborhoods of high- and extreme-poverty and
affluence constitute larger shares of metropolitan areas. Overall, metropolitan areas with
below average growth have higher levels of income segregation than metropolitan areas
with strong growth rates. Low-income individuals are more segregated and more likely to
live in an extreme-poverty neighborhood if they live in the weaker metropolitan areas.
The gap between the two groups of metros, however, diminished between 1990
and 2010. If successful metropolitan areas continue to attract affluent populations, this
study suggests those affluent populations will continue to segregate at a faster rate than in
metropolitan areas experiencing slower growth. Although weaker metropolitan areas
experience higher levels of income segregation, it is important to note the consequences
of high levels of the segregation of affluence. An increasing isolation of affluence signals
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a potential isolation of the best public goods, such as schools, parks, greenspaces, and
infrastructure (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a). If affluence continues to segregate, both
low- and middle-income populations may experience ramifications. Ultimately, ensuring
all populations have access to opportunity is the most important outcome. This research
indicates low-income individuals are less likely to be segregated from other populations
if they live in one of the stronger metropolitan areas.
Future research initiatives should include a more in-depth analysis of each
metropolitan area, examining both poverty and affluence. A qualitative approach may
indicate perceptions about segregation and opportunity within each of the metropolitan
areas. Further, an examination of local policies aimed at affordable housing or zoning
policies may provide additional insight into segregation levels in each metropolitan area.
From a quantitative approach, information on housing prices and ownership percentages
within neighborhoods of affluence and poverty could provide further depth and improve
understanding at the neighborhood and metropolitan scale. Investigating ways for weaker
metropolitan areas to reduce the segregation of poverty is needed and crucial for future
generations as successful metros attract greater shares of population and economic
output. Lastly, further studies should focus on the segregation of affluence. Recent
studies (Reardon and Bischoff 2011a; 2011b; Fry and Taylor 2012) indicate an increasing
segregation of affluent populations, but potential solutions receive little attention.
Although weaker metropolitan areas exhibit higher levels of income segregation, the
segregation of affluence is increasing. If this pattern continues, it will soon outpace the
segregation of poverty, regardless of measure.
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